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Abstract 
The thesis takes it point of departure in institutional changes after the global 
financial crisis. More specifically, it scrutinizes the changes in the International 
Monetary Fund (the IMF) in the light of the financial crisis. Furthermore, it 
scrutinizes how these changes have possibly prevailed. This is done by first 
identifying changes in the debate on development policies and changes in the 
global economic architecture, after the financial crisis. It is argued that counter-
cyclical polices are given more attention in the debate after the crisis than was the 
case before, however the changes in positions of core actors in the debate are very 
limited. A bigger change is that after the financial crisis the issue of reforming 
international financial institutions (IFIs) have changed. It is suggested in the 
debate that emerging economies should gain more influence in the IFIs. 
Regarding the global economic architecture after the financial crisis it is 
suggested that there is a larger economical development in China compared to 
other countries as well as a larger dependency on China from other countries. A 
theoretical model on institutional changes from a critical theory perspective is 
then used to explain how a changed debate and a new global economic 
architecture are influencing changes in the IMF after the outbreak of the financial 
crisis. Two tendencies on how the institutions will possibly develop are found. 
One suggestion is that China and other emerging economies will gain more 
influence in the IMF. The other suggestion is that China creates alternative 
financial institutions together with other non-western countries and that the IMF 
continues according to the Washington Consensus and the neo liberal agenda that 
has governed the IFIs during the last two decades. It is concluded that probably 
we will experience a mix of the two tendencies.     
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financial crisis, development policies, institutional change, emerging economies 
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1 Introduction 
The global financial crisis is currently shaking the world. Millions of people are 
affected and wonder where the crisis will take us. A lively debate on how to coupe 
with the crisis and its aftermaths has occupied worlds leaders for months. Political 
leaders, social movements and scholars, have called for change. There are many 
questions and answers, and various opinions on how to achieve the best results. In 
this debate, The Group of 20 (G20) has taken a leading role in dealing with the 
difficult situation discussing the focus of the response to the crisis. Various 
actions have also been conducted in the attempt to stimulate the largest economies 
in the world and to strengthen the international financial institutions 
(G20,2008:1,http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/02/g20-economy). 
 
Many different approaches have been put forward on how to change the 
current situation, there are also an endless number of speculations on what will 
come out of such a turbulent period of time. Some scholars have argued that a 
radical change in the neo liberal system, being the most dominating policy making 
approach of economic institutions in the world during the last two decades, is 
needed (see for example Wade 2008, Stiglitz 2008). Others call for more 
moderate changes (see for example Rodrik 2009). The discussion in the light of 
the financial crisis has shed light on many different economic, financial and 
political issues. It has also put focus on the governance structure of the global 
economic system. In relation to this discussion the governance of development 
policies are highlighted. Is the current financial crisis even triggering a new 
paradigm within development policies?  
 
Possible challenges posted by the financial crisis to development policies are 
the starting-point for this thesis. Are we in the middle of a turbulent period that 
will change this field for many years to come? This general question has been the 
motivation for us while working with this thesis. 
1.1 Defining the field 
 
The Washington Consensus, being an important part of the neo-liberal agenda has 
been the dominant ideology governing development policies for the last two 
decades. Broadly, the rules include among other things liberalizing trade,  
focusing on export-led growth, letting the market operate without involvement 
from the state and keeping the inflation rate low (Thomas 2008:434). This 
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dominant ideological agenda has been criticised before and in a time of financial 
crisis the criticism has been highlighted more than usual. This has been done by 
for example left wing politicians, social movements and NGOs, seeing it as threat 
to welfare and progress in developing countries and a method of the west to 
impose dominant neo liberal values on developing countries. The Washington 
Consensus has also been criticized from inside the International Financial 
Institutions. Joseph Stiglitz, the former vice president of the World Bank has been 
one of their main critics. Thus, the Washington consensus has, long before the 
current crisis, been under debate (Stiglitz 2008, Oxfam 2008).  
 
The IMF and the World Bank are the two dominant and executive institutions 
within the Washington Consensus neo liberal agenda. What we attempt to do in 
this thesis is to scrutinize institutional changes in the field of development 
policies. When doing so we have chosen to focus on the International Monetary 
Fund (the IMF). This is done partly since the IMF is one of the main institutions 
under the Washington Consensus and as such an important institution governing 
development policies. The IMF has also gained a lot of attention in the debate 
after the outbreak of the financial crisis. Thus, by examining changes in the IMF 
we will also scrutinize if the neo liberal agenda within the Washington Consensus, 
to some extent is changing (Thomas, 2008:423ff, Rodrik, 01.2009, Oxfam 
11.2008, UNDP 28.01.2009, The Economist 11.04.2009 ).    
 
In a situation of a global financial crisis starting at the core of the neo-liberal 
agenda (in the western countries) there might be a window of opportunity to put 
forward alternative development policies. Thus, the current situation is an 
interesting period of time for scrutinizing whether a new challenge has arisen to 
the Washington Consensus. Furthermore it is interesting to see if developing 
countries and emerging economies in times of recession in western countries are 
getting more influence in global political economy, in our case regarding the issue 
of development policies, to a larger extent than before the crisis. 
 
As stated above ever since its’ origin in the 1980´s the Washington Consensus 
has been debated. The debate in the light of the current financial crisis puts 
forward a new such challenge to the Washington Consensus. At this point it has 
even been argued that the Washington Consensus is dead (Maxwell, 2005: 1). 
Could it be that the financial crisis is triggering a new crisis – a crisis in 
governance of development policies? 
1.2 Research Question 
 
Possible triggers evolving from the current financial crisis could challenge the 
governance of development policies and possibly also challenge the Washington 
Consensus. What we want to scrutinize in this thesis are the triggers that might be 
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influential in this process and how this process is developing. When doing so we 
have chosen to focus on the IMF, as mentioned above. The following research 
question will be our point of departure; 
 
To what extent, and how, has the financial crisis triggered changes in one of the 
main institutions governing development policies, the International Monetary 
Fund (the IMF)? 
 
To be able to answer the different parts of the main research question above, we 
will use the following sub-questions; 
 
To what extent has the financial crisis triggered changes in the global economic 
architecture? 
 
To what extent has the financial crisis triggered changes in the debate on 
development policies? 
 
How has the new economic architecture and the new ideas arising from the 
financial crisis possibly changed the International Monetary Fund (the IMF)?  
1.3 Limitations 
 
Due to limitations in time and space and the many dimension of the current crisis 
it is of course not possible to scrutinize all the material available on the subject. 
When scrutinizing the debate on development policies we have therefore limited 
our scope to a number of key documents from three chosen actors in the debate. 
The actors are; The IMF, the G20 and The UN commission of Experts on 
Reforms of The International monetary and financial system (also referred to as 
the Crisis Commission in the thesis). These three actors are frequently referred to 
in the debate on the developing policies (Rodrik, 01.2009, Oxfam 11.2008, UNDP 
28.01.2009, The Economist 11.04.2009). Furthermore, the chosen core actors also 
hold different positions in the debated issues. Thus, a broader range of arguments 
and positions reflected in the debate will be captured. 
 
We have also limited the number of measurements examined to discuss changes 
in the financial architecture. We have chosen to look at statistics of GDP-growth, 
Net Trade and Balance of Payments for a number of the largest economies in the 
world. These measurements are chosen because they were frequently mentioned 
while discussing a possible new global financial architecture (The Economist 
28.02.2009, The Guardian 06.11.2008, Rodrik & Subramanian 25.02.2008). 
Furthermore, it was also possible to excess the figure for these measurements for 
the countries we chose to examine (which is not the case for some other 
measurements).  
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Additionally, when scrutinizing how the IMF might be changing we have selected 
a number of academic articles and new paper articles. There are a large number of 
articles discussing this, however we have tried to capture articles from different 
perspectives and from well known commentators in the field. These articles will 
be further presented later. 
1.4 Roadmap for the thesis 
 
In chapter two we provide the reader with background information on the main 
concepts and institutions used in the thesis. Thus, the Washington Consensus and 
criticism to it will be outlined. Furthermore the institutions governed by the 
Washington Consensus will also be presented, i.e. the IMF and the World Bank. 
Moreover a short background on the current financial crisis will be outlined.  
Finally we will present the background of the core actors in the debate on 
development policies; the IMF, the G20 and the Crisis Commission. 
 
In chapter three our theoretical starting-points are being outlined. In the first 
section of the theory chapter of the thesis the intention is to map the debate on 
development policies. We will then motivate the choice of core actors and the key 
issues from the debate. To examine institutional changes we have decided to use 
critical theory, being the overall theoretical perspective. Within critical theory we 
have chosen a specific theory examining institutional changes. The theory is 
suggesting that the changes in institutions prevail when three components in the 
world order are changing. These components are material capabilities, ideas and 
institutions. This theoretical framework will be further outlined in chapter three.  
 
In chapter four we will present the methods and material used in the thesis. 
We will examine the empirical material using both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches, depending on what we are scrutinizing. How we go about doing this 
will be further outlined in chapter 4. In this chapter the intention is furthermore to 
present the key documents used in the thesis. Finally, the three components, 
material capabilities, ideas and institutions will be operationalized. 
 
In the fifth chapter our empirical findings and the analysis will be presented. 
This will be done by letting the three components material capabilities, ideas and 
institutions guide us in answering our sub-research questions. By doing this, we 
will be able to answer the main research question at the end of this chapter. 
 
In chapter six we will summaries our findings and give a short version-answer 
to the research questions. 
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When working on the thesis, we came across theoretical and methodological 
choices that have determined how our thesis has developed. In the last chapter we 
will reflect on some of these choices.  
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2 Background 
The aim of this chapter is to outline the background of key elements presented in 
the thesis. We will begin by presenting the Washington Consensus which plays a 
major role in understanding governance of development policies in the last two 
decades. The main emphasis will be put on a historical overview and on criticism 
by scholars towards the consensus. We will then give a background to the main 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) working within the agenda of the 
Washington Consensus. These institutions are the IMF and the World Bank, both 
with its origin at the Breton Woods Conference at the end of the Second World 
War. In the sequel section, emphasis will be put on the current financial crisis and 
possible reasons for its outbreak. Finally, focus will be put the core actors used to 
frame the debate on development policies in our thesis, these actors are as 
mentioned in the introduction; The IMF, The G20 and The UN commission of 
experts on reform of the international monetary and financial system.  
2.1 From State led to market led focus in 
development policies and the evolvement of the 
Washington Consensus  
In the 1950s´and until the 1970s´the prime engine for development was the state 
where the state for example was given freedom to set up tariffs to protect national 
industry. Import-substitution industrialization (ISIs) was at the core of the 
development agenda for developing countries. It was argued that this would 
enable them to break with the dependency of the west and instead focus on 
developing their own national industry. In the 1980s there was a clear shift from 
this state-led growth to a market-led approach. The new approach included giving 
the state less importance in development policies and instead giving market forces 
the dominant role. A new era governed by a neo liberalist approach emerged 
(Thomas, 2008:423ff).  
 
The neo-liberal era originated from The US president Ronald Reagan and The 
Prime minister of the UK, Margaret Thatcher whom promoted ideas for a free 
market ideology including for instance opening up trade boarders in the 
developing countries. The World Bank and the IMF were given more prominent 
roles as the institutions to promote the ideas by putting them into action when 
managing third world dept. New short-term loans were issued with conditions that 
demanded policy reforms in developing countries. With the fall of the eastern bloc 
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these western institutions became the ones to constitute development policies. We 
refer to them as western even though they include members from all over the 
world. This is due to the governance structure where a members voting power is 
weighted in relation to its economic contribution. Since the western countries 
account for a vast majority of the budget, they are also controlling the institutions 
(Stiglitz, 2002:13-14, Thomas, 2008:417, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm) 
 
At the core of this neo liberal system was the Washington Consensus. The 
Washington Consensus was developed during the 1980´s as the new ideological 
foundation in global politics, especially in global political economy. The 
Washington Consensus was a set of neo liberal development policies and was first 
phrased by John Williamson in 1989. Since the 1980´s it has also been the main 
ideological framework for development policies. Broadly, the rules include 
liberalizing trade, investments and finance, letting the market to operate without 
involvement from the state and controlling inflation. The export-led growth was 
preached, primarily by the IMF and the World Bank, as the way forward for 
developing countries. Furthermore, this neo liberal approach advances the notion 
that underdevelopment is caused by internal factors and rejects external or 
structural explanations. The state was seen as an enabler of the private sector and 
the agenda broke with the notion of the offensive state e.g. setting up programs for 
industrial development (Sakakibara, 1999:182, Thomas 2008: 424, 434). 
  
More explicitly the Washington consensus consists of ten reforms; 
 
1. Fiscal discipline: budget deficits should be small enough to be 
financed without recourse to the inflation tax. 
2. Public expenditure priorities: public expenditure should be 
redirected from politically sensitive areas that receive more 
resources than their economic return can justify toward 
neglected fields with high economic returns and the potential 
to improve income distribution, such as primary education and 
health, and infrastructure. 
3. Tax reform: to broaden the tax base and cut marginal tax rates. 
4. Financial liberalization: an ultimate objective of marketdetermined 
interest rates. 
5. Exchange rate policy: a unified exchange rate at a level sufficiently 
competitive to induce a rapid growth in non-traditional 
exports. A competitive exchange rate is a rate that is either 
not misaligned or undervalued; nevertheless overvaluation is 
worse than undervaluation. 
6. Trade liberalization: quantitative trade restrictions to be rapidly 
replaced by tariffs, which would be progressively reduced up to 
a uniform low rate in the range of 10–20% was achieved. 
7. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): abolition of barriers impeding 
the entry of FDI. 
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8. Privatization: privatization of state enterprises. 
9. Deregulation: abolition of regulations that impede the entry of 
new firms or restrict competition. 
10. Property rights: the provision of secure property rights, especially 
to the informal sector. 
(Marangos, 2009:198-199) 
 
During the 1990´s the IMF and the World Bank were practically the only 
option for developing countries wishing to get a loan. However, developing 
countries had to comply with the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) set up by 
the institutions. From there on, developing countries were no longer allowed to 
use for example high tariffs to protect the national industry or to subsidise it for 
development purposes. Thus, the demand to comply with a neo liberal agenda has 
led to a diminished importance for the state and restricted the room for manoeuvre 
for governments in developing countries (Thomas 2008:423ff). 
2.2 Criticism to the Washington consensus and 
alternative pathways for development 
 
The Washington consensus has been, since implemented, the dominating 
governance of development policies. However, it has been challenged by critics 
throughout the years, one of the main criticisms being that it promotes a box 
solution with a one size fits all policy based on the neo liberal agenda outlined 
above (Thomas, 2008:424). No alternative approaches have been promoted by the 
IMF and the World Bank. This has been the case even though, broadly, Latina 
American countries for example experienced high inflation and large deficits in 
their balance of payment and whereas Asian countries had much more balanced 
budgets. It is also criticised for being put forward as conditinalities on developing 
countries for them to be granted support from the IFIs. The IFIs have also been 
criticised for giving developing countries very limited amount of influence within 
the institutions. Moreover, it has been argued that empirical evidence suggests 
that the neo liberal agenda is not working. A number of examples of this have 
been put forward, for example; 
 
- Economic growth is lower than expected in countries that have undertaken 
neo liberal policies 
- Countries adjusting to the neo liberal principles have not manage to get rid 
of their high depts 
- Developing countries share of world trade is very unequally distributed. 
The same is true for FDI. The largest share is found in China and other 
East Asian countries. 
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- Privatization of for example water have failed to provide better access to 
essential services like this. 
 
(Thomas, 2008: 424-436, Wade, 2009: 7-8) 
  
In the light of for example the Asian Crisis a lot of criticism was posed to the 
IMF and the World Bank. As a response to this the IFIs introduced the National 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). To be granted support from the IFIs 
a PRSP was demanded from the receiving country. It was argued that these would 
increase developing countries influence on their national development policies. It 
has been questioned whether this development in the IMF and the World Bank 
has changes anything for real. Critics argue that this has rather increased the IFIs 
surveillance of the receiving countries since these countries have to reveal their 
complete plan for development. Furthermore, when examining the PRSP the neo 
liberal agenda is still dominating. Thus, it has been argued that there is a self-
censoring from countries writing the PREP since they do not expect to get support 
from the IFIs if they are not undertaking neo liberal policies (Thomas, 2008: 435).     
 
Joseph Stiglitz has been one of the more recent critics of the Washington 
Consensus and the IFIs. The development of one alternative approach to 
development policies, with Stiglitz and other scholars in the front are often 
referred to as The Post Washington Consensus or the Post Washington Consensus 
Consensus. As a former Vice president of the World Bank, he argues for financial 
institutes like the IMF and World Bank to undertake major reforms. Even though 
many have come forward criticizing the Washington consensus Stiglitz is coming 
from inside the system. Thus, it might be harder to ignore his view. Stiglitz 
criticizes for instance the limited focus of the IFIs, only promoting a neo-liberal 
agenda and approaching every country with the same policy package. 
Furthermore, he is highlighting the hypocrisy of the Washington Consensus. He 
argues that when western countries for example undertake counter-cyclical 
reforms to boost demand in their economies, developing countries are told to 
tighten their policies (Stiglits, 2008: 310). Similar arguments have been put 
forward by other scholars (see for example Wade, 2008: 1).  
 
In his attempt to present an emerging theory for an alternative consensus, 
Stiglitz summarizes his main suggestions in six points. These should be viewed as 
a point of departure for a development process of what he calls a Post-Washington 
Consensus Consensus. Stiglitz is arguing that; 
 
- Involvement of local stakeholder in the developing world in working on a 
successful development strategy is one of the key elements for positive results. 
- One size fits all policies, which have been dominant in the work of the IFIs, 
in his opinion, is not promising a positive results.  
- Sufficiently strong theoretical and empirical evidence within economics, 
regarding development, could be met with better research. This would result in a 
broader consensus on how to handle various developmental problems and would 
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give countries room for manoeuvre to develop their own solution for 
development.  
- A balanced role between markets and government is an important factor in a 
Post-Washington Consensus Consensus.  
- Strengthening both state and market institutions is required to achieve 
development. 
- It is important to use other measuring methods than an increase in GDP, thus 
focusing on long term results and a broader set of measures including 
environmental and social sustainability.  
 (Stiglitz:2008:53-54) 
2.3 The Bretton Woods institutions 
 
The IMF and The World Bank were both founded during The Bretton Woods 
conference in 1944 which brought together the western allies of the Second World 
War to discuss the future of international finance in the post-war period 
(Ravenhill, 2008: 14). As outlined above, today the IMF and the World Bank are 
important institutions within the neo liberal agenda of the Washington Consensus. 
2.3.1 The IMF 
The purpose of the IMF was originally to promote global and financial 
cooperation and to provide short-term loans to countries with temporary problems 
in their balance of payment (Helleiner, 2008:220).  
 
As a result of the Bretton Woods Conference the member states agreed to keep 
their exchange rates in connection to convertibility of the US dollar towards gold.  
By 1971, when the US suspended the convertibility of the dollar to gold it was 
substituted with a floating exchange rate system. This marked the end of what is 
often referred to as the Bretton Wood system and new challenges where evolving 
for its´ financial institutions (IMF and WB). In the years ahead the purpose of the 
IMF developed towards loans to developing countries and from the mid 1970´s 
and onwards the focus was on responding to the balance of payments difficulties 
in the worlds poorest countries. This included providing concessional financing 
and in 1986 the IMF began providing new concessional loans through Structural 
Adjustment programs (SAP), demanding economic policy reform in the 
developing countries before issuing loans (Thomas, 2008: 420ff).   
 
The role of the IMF includes promoting international monetary cooperation 
and exchange rate stability, facilitating the balanced growth of international trade, 
and providing resources to help members in balance of payments difficulties or 
assisting in poverty reduction (http://www.imf.org/external/about/overview.htm). 
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The IMFs´ funding comes from its member states. All members pay a “quota” 
to the institution largely reflecting its size in world economy. If acquiring 
assistance the quota size of each country determines the amount of money 
possible to borrow. Quotas are determining as well the voting shares of each 
country within the fund. In recent years the balance of quotas has changed where 
the US, which had a share of 30% originally has fallen to 17%. Meanwhile 
nations like China, Japan, Germany and Saudi Arabia have increased their share. 
The IMF is governed by the Board of Governors and the day to day decision 
making is in the hands of The Executive board including 24 executive directors 
(Helleiner:2008:220-222)  
 
2.3.2 The World Bank 
 
The World Bank today consists of The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). Only 
the IBRD was founded during the Bretton Wood conference with an original 
purpose to provide long-term loans for reconstruction and development after the 
Second World War. Today there is a division between the IBRD focusing on 
middle income and creditworthy poor countries and the International 
Development Association (IDA), addressing the poorest countries (Helleiner, 
2008:222).  
 
These institutions, in the name of the World Bank, give financial and technical 
assistance to developing countries and are owned by its´ 185 member countries. 
Noted on the World Bank website the institution is providing interest free credits, 
low-interest loans and grants to developing countries for multiple purposes for 
example investments in health, education, administration, infrastructure and 
development in the financial and private sector 
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,pagePK:50
004410~piPK:36602~theSitePK:29708,00.html ).  
2.4 The current financial crisis 
 
The world is in a financial crisis, some argue that it is the deepest one since the 
great depression in the 1930s. A number of reasons have been highlighted as 
being the ones causing the crisis. The magnitude of the crisis, argued in a working 
paper from the UNDP, is linked to the inadequate regulation and supervision of 
the financial Institutions and the Banking sector. The dramatic decrease in real 
estate prices in the US has also played a major role in causing the crisis (UNDP, 
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2009:6).The newly established Commission of Experts on Reforms of The 
International monetary and financial system (also referred to as the crisis 
commission) has argued that the financial crisis is viewed widely to be the 
consequence of lax regulatory policies in the more advanced industrial countries. 
This is evident in loose monetary policies and supervision of financial actors 
(Recommendations from The commission of Experts on Reforms of The 
International monetary and financial system 19.03.2009). 
 
Since the global economy is highly integrated the crisis has quickly spread 
from its´ origin in the US to other western countries, but also further to emerging 
economies as well as to developing countries. Even though the crisis is now a 
global one, it started in western countries, at the core of the neo-liberal agenda. 
Furthermore commentators are more or less agreeing that the causes of crisis are 
related to lack of market control (within the financial sector). Thus, they are 
identifying the core of the neo-liberal agenda as being responsible for the crisis. 
The Washington Consensus being an important strand of the neo-liberal agenda 
some may say it leaves a window of opportunity for debates on alternative 
developmental policies (Recommendations from The commission of Experts on 
Reforms of The International monetary and financial system 19.03.2009).  
 
Mentioning the crisis commission above, this leads us to core actors in the 
debate of development policies in the light of the current financial crisis. While 
there are many actors participating in the debate, in the following section the 
intention is to put forward the background of the core actors in the debate, whom 
we have chosen to focus on.  
2.5 Core actors in the debate on development policies 
The core actors chosen in the thesis are to different extents all part of a global 
system working with development policies and are all focusing and contributing 
to the debate on the Washington Consensus, the current financial crisis and its 
possible impact on development policies. Since the IMF has been presented above 
it will not be presented any further in this section. Why these core actors are 
chosen is further outlined in the theory chapter.  
 
2.5.1 The commission of Experts on Reforms of the International 
monetary and financial system 
 
The commission of Experts on Reforms of the International monetary and 
financial system (in this thesis referred to as the Crisis Commission) is a 
commission conducted by the President of the General Assembly, as the United 
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Nations response to the current financial crisis. The purpose is to review how 
global financial system is functioning and to explore ways to make it more secure, 
just and sustainable with the aim to secure global economic order in the future. 
The commission is chaired by Joseph Stiglitz. The Crisis commission is focusing 
on developing countries in particular. The reason for doing so is because of the 
quick spread of the financial crisis around the globe, affecting both developed 
countries as well as developing countries. In this context the Crisis commission is 
concerned that action taken are not taken developing countries into account (Note 
by the President of the General Assembly 19th
2.5.2 The G20  
 of March 2009). It can be argued 
that the Crisis Commission gives a more alternative approach to the crisis and the 
Washington Consensus compared to the other two core actors in the debate. 
The Group of Twenty (the G20) was established in 1999 to promote cooperation 
of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in powerful developed and 
developing economies. The purpose was to bring together these nations to discuss 
important issues regarding global economy. The first meeting of the G20 was held 
in Berlin in December 1999. Finance ministers and central bank governors of 19 
countries are included in the G20 as well as the European Union. The Chair of the 
International Monetary and Financial Committee as well as the Development 
Committee of the IMF and World Bank also participate in G-20 meetings. 
   
The G20 accounts for two-thirds of the world population, 90 per cent of global 
gross national product and 80 per cent of world trade 
(http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx). Since it gathers the nations with 
the most power to take action against the crisis the G20 is a highly important 
voice in the debate.  
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3 Theory 
In this chapter we will outline the theoretical frames for the thesis and explain 
how it will guide us in answering the research question.  
  
What we are dealing with in the project is changes in one of the main 
institutions governing development policies – the International Monetary Fund 
(the IMF). The IMF is chosen since it is one of the main institutions within the 
Washington Consensus and therefore an important actor governing development 
policies. Furthermore, it is also one of the international financial institutions given 
the most attention after the outbreak of the financial crisis (see for example 
Thomas, 2008:423ff, Rodrik, 01.2009, Oxfam 11.2008, UNDP 28.01.2009, The 
Economist 11.04.2009). To be able to scrutinize possible changes in the IMF we 
have chosen a theoretical model with the purpose to explain institutional change. 
In the model three components are said to interact to achieve institutional change; 
material capabilities, ideas, and institutions.  
 
The material capabilities is a concept outlining economic capacity. In this 
thesis we will examine changes in material capabilities for the largest countries in 
the world in terms of economic capacity. In the analysis we will then scrutinize 
changes in material capabilities and answer the sub-research question; To what 
extent has the financial crisis triggered changes in the global economic 
architecture? 
 
The ideas examine changes in the debate in the field where the institution is 
working, in our case within development policies. To be able to examine changes 
in ideas we will identify the most important actors and issues in the debate. This 
will be done in the method chapter. In the analysis we will then scrutinize changes 
in the debate and answer the sub-research question; To what extent has the 
financial crisis triggered changes in the debate on development policies? 
 
Below we will present the theoretical model to explain on a theoretical level 
how the three components ideas, material capabilities and institutions are 
possibly interacting to achieve institutional change. The theoretical model will 
guide us through the last section of the analysis where we will answer the last sub-
research question; How has the new economic architecture and the new ideas 
arising from the financial crisis possibly changed the International Monetary 
Fund (the IMF)? When the theoretical model is presented it will motivate why 
this specific model is chosen rather than other theoretical models explaining 
institutional change. 
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3.1 Theoretical model explaining institutional change 
When discussing how institutional change arises there are a few possible 
theoretical alternatives to chose from, see for example Blyth (2001) from a social 
constructivist school focusing on the importance of ideas for changing 
institutions. However, the one theoretical model that we have chosen for the thesis 
is the outlined by a scholar within critical theory, Robert Cox. Where the social 
constructivist model focuses on ideas for changes in institutions to arise, the 
critical theory model will also take other components into consideration. Thus, it 
gives a broader theoretical framework to possibly explain how changes in 
institutions arise. An extended discussion on the choice of theoretical model will 
be outlined in the concluding remarks, in chapter seven. 
 
The uniting ontological point of departure within critical theory is scrutinizing 
origins of institutions and phenomenon in society and to try to review structures 
(read the capitalist system) that is generally taken for granted, and instead 
highlight alternative perspectives or changes. Critical scholars are also interested 
in scrutinizing how the capitalist system is affecting the people who live within it, 
focusing on how the distribution within the system are favouring certain groups 
more than others (originally from a class based approach but in more modern 
version some scholars are also emphasising e.g. gender, ethnicity and sexual 
orientation). Critical theory is a heterogeneous approach covering a number of 
different theoretical schools.  
 
Within critical theory Robert Cox is one of the most influential scholars in a 
school developed within the field of international relations. In his works, Cox 
argues that the world order can be traced back to the forced institutionalization of 
social relations of production consistent with capital accumulation. His work 
could be seen as a reaction to other IR-scholars concentrating on how to manage 
problem within the system, scholars that Cox categorizes as ´problem- solving´. In 
reverse, Cox wants to highlight the foundations of the system and call these 
foundations into question. In the theoretical model we will use for this thesis, Cox 
sets out to explain how the component in world order interact and thereby are able 
to change the world order. Since the purpose of our thesis is to scrutinize changes 
in one of the main institution governing development polices, critical theory is 
suitable since it enables us to review the foundation of the institution (i.e. the 
economic architecture and the debate before the crisis) and consider whether the 
institution will change if the foundation is changing (Watson, 2008:40, Cox, 
1986:205ff).  
3.1.1 The three components in the world order 
In his theoretical model Cox describes the world order as being constructed from 
three components or forces; material capabilities, ideas and institutions. In this 
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section we will present the content of each of the three components as well as 
explain how they interact to achieve changes. The three components, Cox argues, 
should not be seen as if they determine world order, but rather they should be 
looked upon as imposing pressures and constraints. Cox continues to argue that; 
´Individuals and groups may move with the pressures or resist and oppose them, 
but they cannot ignore them´ (Cox, 1986:217-218).  
 
Material capabilities 
According to Cox material capabilities are; 
 
 ‘productive and destructive potentials within a world order that 
exists as technological and organizational capabilities, and in their 
accumulated forms as natural resources which technology can 
transform, stocks of equipment (for example industries and 
armaments), and the wealth which can command these’.     
 
    Cox, 1986:218    
 
This can be interpreted as Cox arguing that material capabilities in for 
example a specific country are only potentials within an international context 
where certain technological and organizational capabilities are present for that 
specific country. The capabilities available could for examples be determent by 
the amount of assets available for investments and trade agreements regulating 
FDIs or import substitution policies. Cox argue that these material capabilities can 
be either productive or destructive (possibly both) and either help or aggravate the 
countries economic (and possibly political) impact (Cox, 1986:218).  
 
 
 Ideas 
To explain ideas as another component in the world system Cox distinguishes 
between the two types of ideas; intersubjective meanings and collective images. 
Intersubjective meanings are shared notions in social relations which individuals 
find self-evident in their lives and which are putting forward expectations in social 
contexts. As an example Cox argues that the nation state as an organisational 
structure for individuals can be interpreted as an intersubjective meaning (Cox, 
1986:218).  
 
On the contrary, collective images are opposing ideas held by different social 
groups. Different collective images hold different ontological understandings, for 
example on what constitutes social justice. Thus, clashes between different 
collective images appear when they are struggling within institutions. The 
presence of different collective images within an institution hold an important 
position within the theoretical framework since they provide evidence that 
alternative paths are possible within the given issue area as opposed to when a 
single intersubjective meaning governs an institution. Where intersubjective 
meanings remain the same over a long period of time and sets the frames for the 
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social discourse, there might be several and opposing collective images at the 
same time (Cox, 1986:218-219).     
 
 
Institutions  
The third and last components in Cox theoretical framework are the institutions.  
 
‘Institutionalization is a mean of stabilizing and perpetuating a 
particular order. Institutions reflex the power relations prevailing at 
the point of origin and tend, at least initially, to encourage collective 
images consistent with these power relations. Eventually, institutions 
take on their own life; they can become battleground of opposing 
tendencies, or rival institutions may reflect different tendencies. 
Institutions are particular amalgams of ideas and material power 
which in turn influence the development of ideas and material 
capabilities’.  
Cox, 1986:219   
    
The institutions are at the core of Cox’s theoretical framework since it is the 
forum for interaction between the three components in the world order. When the 
institution is constructed a collective image reflecting the power relations 
prevailing at that time will be governing the institution. However, the institution 
can then take on its´ own evolution and thereby produce new tendencies within 
global politics (Cox, 1986:219).  
 
It is the interaction of the three components that then pressures for changes 
within the institution. About the interaction between the three components Cox 
argues that;  
 
´(n)o one-way determinism need be assumed among these three; 
the relationship can be assumed to be reciprocal. The question of 
which way the lines of force run is always a historical question to 
be answered by a study of the particular case`.  
      
    Cox, 1986:218 
 
The process is illustrated by the model below. In this process conflict is a key 
concept. Cox argues that in the conflict between opposing tendencies there is a 
`continual remaking of human nature and the creation of new patterns of social 
reactions which change the rules of the game´, i.e. Cox views conflicts as a 
possible cause of institutional change (Cox, 1986:215ff).    
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1. An institution is at its´ origin a reflection of collective images consistent with 
power relations prevailing at that time. 
 
    
 
2. The institution is effected by ideas and material capabilities but also the 
institution itself can influence new ideas and material capabilities. Thus, there is 
an inter-action between the three components and this inter-action is the one that 
constitutes changes in the institution. 
 
 
 
Theoretical model of institutional change 
 
 
Institutions 
Material 
capabilities 
Ideas 
Institutions  
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4 Material and method 
In this chapter we will present our methodological as well as material choices for 
the thesis. The chapter starts by presenting how we will use a text analysis and 
quantitative measurements in the thesis. We will then outline the empirical 
material used in the thesis and discuss the time frame for our work. Finally, we 
will operationalize our theoretical concepts to enable us to use them to measure 
the empirical material.  
 
4.1 Qualitative text analysis and quantitative 
measurements 
The main part of the analysis is done by using a qualitative text analysis. We have 
chosen this kind of text analysis since we are dealing with complex arguments in 
policy documents. Thus, a quantitative method would have been too superficial 
and unable to capture the context in which the point of views from the core actors 
are being discussed. The text analysis is being conducted by operationalizing our 
theoretical concepts into indicators that will guide us through the empirical 
material and create the frames for the analysis. In addition to the qualitative text 
analysis we have also used statistics to be able to scrutinize the theoretical concept 
material capabilities. Thus, this part will be done by analyzing quantitative 
material.  
4.1.1 Materials to scrutinize how institutional changes arise 
 
Material capabilities 
As mentioned above we will use statistics to scrutinize changes in material 
capabilities. We went through statistics from all the G20 countries since they are 
the largest countries, in terms of economic capacity, in the world. These figures 
where then narrowed down to figures from five countries. These countries were 
chosen since they are the ones mostly discussed in the debate on changes in the 
global economic architecture and furthermore, they are the ones showing the most 
changes among the countries examined. The figures were gathered from the IMF 
website and the OECD website. 
 
 
  23 
Ideas 
To be able to map the debate on development policies (which will be outlined in 
the idea section in the operationalizing part of this chapter) we have gone through 
a large number of academic articles and news paper articles from well known 
international financial and economic magazines (e.g. The Economist, Financial 
Times etc.). From this research we have manage to narrow down three important 
core actors (as presented above) from the debate (examples of used articles are;  
Documents about the importance of the chosen core actors from “independent” 
sources, i.e. academic articles and news paper articles. Examples of used articles 
for this are; Rodrik, 01.2009, Oxfam 11.2008, UNDP 28.01.2009, The Economist 
11.04.2009, Griffith-Jones 03.2009, The Economist 15.11.2008, Business Week 
20.04.2009, ILO 2009, Thirlwell 2009, The Economist 14.03.2009.  
 
The same method was used to narrow down the key issues in the debate. 
Examples of used articles for this are; Rodrik, 01.2009, Rodrik & Subramanian 
25.02.2008, Guardian 06.11.2008, Zoellick 25.01.2009, Mattoo & Subramanian 
08.11.2008, Third World Network 11.03.2009, The Economist 07.02.2009, 
UNDP 18.01.2009, The Economist 11.04.2009, The Economist 28.03.2009, Wade 
2008, Thirlwell 2009, Wade & Ocampo 2009, The Guardian 21.10.2008, Harold 
01.2009. We also used articles from the core actors to identify the key issues in 
the debate. 
 
When scrutinizing changes in ideas in the debate on development policies 
among our core actors we choose key documents and reports from these actors.  
 
We have chosen to use the World Economic Outlook, fact sheets, statistics 
and articles from the IMF website. The World Economic Outlook is chosen 
because it is the largest report issues by the IMF and their overall report on how 
they view the global economic situation. Thus, it draws a good picture analytical 
perspective which the IMF is representing. In addition to the World Economic 
Outlook be have chosen to use a number of fact sheets about the different lending 
packages when these are discussed in the analysis. They are used to a limited 
extent and only when we needed some additional facts on how the different 
packages are outlined. The World Economic Outlook and the fact sheets are used 
for the ideas section in the analysis. The statistics from the IMF are used to 
describe changes in the material capabilities that could possibly affect the debate. 
Thus, these are not used to scrutinize the IMF position. 
   
From the Crisis Commission we used background papers, recommendations, 
principles, reports from working groups and reference documents from the 
members of the Commission. Since the Commission is recently established they 
have not issued a lot of reports etc, thus we were able to go through all the issues 
material from the Commission. The material is used for the idea section in the 
analysis to outline the point of views from the Crisis Commission. 
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Material chosen from the G20 includes communiqués from the G20 meetings 
of financial ministers as well as from the meeting of leaders of the G20 countries. 
These are the overall documents from the G20 and the documents outlining the 
point of view from the executive level of the G20, i.e. the leaders of the member 
countries. As such, they are the ones best reflecting the point of views of the G20. 
In addition we have also used a few preparation papers for the G20 meeting as 
well as report from some of the working groups relating to our chosen key figures 
in the debate on development policies. However, these documents were only used 
as complements to the communiqués when we wanted to get more in depth 
material for specific parts in the analysis.   
 
Institutions 
To scrutinize how the three components of the world order, described by Cox, 
are interacting we will also use academic articles as well as news paper articles 
analyzing changes in the debate by the core actors. We have chosen well known 
scholars, journalist and managing directors from IFIs and representatives from 
UN agencies and from NGOs representing different point of views to get a broad 
picture of the debate as possible. We will use Thirlwell (2009), Boughton & 
Bradford (2008), Zoellick (2009), Rodrik (01.2009), Wade (2009), Hermele 
(2009), The Economist (11.04.2009), Griffith-Jones & Ocampo (2009), Wade & 
Ocampo (2009) and Altman (01/02.2009).  
4.1.2 Time frame 
We have chosen to limit the examined period of time from 2006 up until today. 
The aim of the thesis is to scrutinize possible in the IMF due to the financial 
crisis. The core actors started debating the crisis in the documents outlined above 
in the beginning of 2008. Thus, we have chosen a time frame that captures a time 
of no crisis in the debate (before beginning of 2008) and the time after the 
outbreak of the crisis (after the beginning of 2008 up until today). It is also clear 
than the statistics that the downturn due to the financial crisis are captured within 
the time frame presented above.     
4.2 Operationalizing changes in the debate 
4.2.1 Material capabilities 
It was stated in the theory chapter that the material capabilities could be for 
example the amount of assets available for investments and trade agreements 
regulating FDIs or import substitution policies. We need to find a way to measure 
these factors to find out whether material capabilities have changed.  
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The measurement we have chosen to use are statistics on GDP for the 
countries involved in the G20. GDP should not be regarded as equivalent to 
material capabilities, but rather as being a product of the amount of material 
capabilities within a nation and how they are being used. If for example the GDP 
for China has increased relatively to the GDP of the US we argue that this is due 
to relative changes in material capabilities between the two nations. The changes 
can be traced to anything from internal factors such as new economic policies, 
increased level of technological knowledge, or new finding of natural resources or 
external factors such as changes in trade agreements. We have no attempt to 
identify what kind of material capability that has possibly changed, we will only 
scrutinize whether the material capabilities as a group has changed. We argue that 
an increase in GDP signifies that the material capabilities (including technological 
and organizational capabilities) are used in a productive way, to use Cox 
terminology. The opposite is true for a destructive use of the material capabilities.  
 
Furthermore we have chosen two other quantitative economic measurements. 
These measurements together with GDP where the ones most often referred to in 
the debate on development policies in light of the financial crisis. The 
measurements are; the G20 countries net trade and the G20 countries balance of 
payments. The chosen measurements are not only the most referred ones, they are 
also the ones said to be the of greatest importance in terms of how a country will 
be able to cope with the crisis, and thereby a countries economic (and possibly 
political) strength relative other countries in global economics (The Economist 
28.02.2009, The Guardian 06.11.2008, Rodrik & Subramanian 25.02.2008, 
Gregson 01.2009, UNDP 28.01.2009, The Economist 11.04.2009, The Economist 
15.11.2009, Wade 2008, Wade & Ocampo 2009, Gowan 2009, The Economist 
10.01.2009, The Economist 31.01.2009, Politikken 03.04.2009, Harold 2009). 
These measurements will be regarded as products of material capabilities, the 
same way as discussed above in the case of GDP. Using other measurements 
enables us to check the validity of measuring the GDP. By comparing the results 
from the different measurements we will get an overall pattern that is a more 
secure measurement of material capabilities than if we where to use only one 
measurement to determine material capabilities.      
 
If these measurements of material capabilities have changed then we will 
regard material capabilities as one possible component for achieving institutional 
change (i.e. changes within the IMF). If for example Chinas GDP has increased 
relatively to the GDP of the US, we will regard this as a change in material 
capabilities and a possible component for achieving changes within the regime. Of 
course the change can be more or less significant and this will also determine to 
what extent it could be argued that it will affect the debate. The significance of the 
statistics will be further discussed in the analysis. 
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4.2.2 Ideas 
The first thing we need to do to when operationalizing the second component of 
the world system, ideas, is to distinguish between the two kinds of ideas; 
intersubjective meanings and collective images. Cox himself illustrates the 
meaning of intersubjective meanings with an example. He argues that the nation 
state as an organisational structure for individuals is an intersubjective meaning 
since close to no one has questioned it as a unit in the global structure.  
 
The neo liberal agenda of the Washington Consensus certainly can be 
regarded as a dominating ideological frame for the developing policy the last two 
decades, but it has not remained unquestioned by the core actors. Thus, we will 
regard those frames as collective images and not as intersubjective meanings.   
 
Mapping the debate on development polices 
To identify changes in collective images we first need to map the debate on 
development policies. This will be done by identifying core actors in the debate as 
well as the key issues mostly discussed. Many actors are taking part in the debate 
and a number of points of views have been put forward. However, in this thesis 
we have identified three core actors as being central to the debate, these are the 
IMF, the G20 and the Crisis Commission.  
 
The actors 
The G20 gathers the most powerful nations in the world and has put the 
financial crisis as the number one issue on their agenda. Within the G20 the 
nations that have the most power to influence global politics in general and in this 
specific case the debate on the development policies in the light of the financial 
crisis are represented. The IMF could be seen as the executive institutions in 
relation to the G20 (or at least to a large number of the states within the G20) 
putting their agenda into practice. The Crisis Commission as a committee under 
the UN general assembly is clearly also being a product of the states represented 
in the G20 since they are all members of the UN and many of them are also 
members of the UN security council. The crisis commission is also a product of 
the crisis, in reverse to the other two core actors which prevailed before the 
current financial crisis. Furthermore, the G20 and the IMF are concerned within a 
broader agenda beyond development policy, but the Crisis Commission has a 
clear mandate to focus solely on developing countries. The three core actors hold 
different positions in the debate on development policies. Where the IMF and the 
G20 could be looked upon as representing a conservative view to development 
policies, the Crisis Commission stands for a relatively more alternative approach. 
Mapping different positions in the development debate gives us alternative inputs 
on where the debate is heading and within what frame the debate is taking place 
(Rodrik, 01.2009, Oxfam 11.2008, UNDP 28.01.2009, The Economist 
11.04.2009, Griffith-Jones 03.2009, The Economist 15.11.2008, Business Week 
20.04.2009, ILO 2009, Thirlwell 2009, The Economist 14.03.2009 ).     
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The issues 
Besides narrowing down the number of actors within the analysis, we also 
need to map the key issues in the debate. Thus, we have identified a number of 
key issues that are setting the frames for the debate among the chosen core actors. 
These issues have been identified by reading reports, articles and other documents 
from and about the core actors taking out the issues given the most space in the 
debate on development policies (Rodrik – Let the Developing Nations Rule, 
Rodrik 12.03.2009, Rodrik & Subramanian 25.02.2008, Guardian 06.11.2008, 
Zoellick 25.01.2009, Mattoo & Subramanian 08.11.2008, Third World Network 
11.03.2009, The Economist 07.02.2009, UNDP 18.01.2009, The Economist 
11.04.2009, The Economist 28.03.2009, Wade 2008, Thirlwell 2009, Wade & 
Ocampo 2009, The Guardian 21.10.2008, Harold 01.2009, Oxfam 11.2008). To 
get a better overview of the issues they are grouped in two sections; Ideological 
issues and Governance issues. The issues are; 
 
Ideological issues 
- Tensing policies or counter-cyclical spending in times of recession and 
crisis 
- Level of state-intervention (bail-outs from states to private actors, 
nationalization of private institutes, guarantees set by governments on 
private credit flows etc) 
- Inequalities to be addressed in development policies or trickle-down when 
the elite increases their assets 
- Openness to trade 
 
Governance issues  
- Conserving, reforming or creating alternative global institutions to the 
IMF (with focus issues relating to policy space, more funding to IMF, 
more impact for emerging economies and developing countries)  
 
If there have been changes in the core actors point of views regarding the 
above mentioned issues (also referred to as indicators), we will regard the 
collective images as changed. Thus, we will regard the changes in collective 
images as a possible component for achieving changes in the debate on 
development policies. This is to say that even if changes have only prevailed in 
one of the indicators presented above, the collective images will be regarded as 
changed. However, to what extent they are changed is determined by how many 
of the above mentioned indicators that changes and to how big the changes are 
within each indicator. Thus, when analysing collective images we will discuss to 
what extent they have changed based on this discussion. Note also the similarities 
to the ten points of the Washington Consensus (from chapter two) in the issues 
outlined above. 
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4.2.3 Institutions 
The institution examined in the thesis is the IMF. Thus, changes prevailing in 
institutions when scrutinizing the empirical material are changes suggested 
prevailing in the IMF. As stated in the theory chapter institutions are the forum for 
interaction between the components of the world order. Furthermore Cox states 
that one cannot predict how the inter-action between the components will prevail 
in reality, it is to be scrutinized within every specific case. 
 
This is to say that we will have to turn to the empirical material to scrutinize 
the process of how material capabilities and ideas are interacting to achieve 
changes in institutions. For this we have to identify a period of time, in our case 
before and after the crisis, to scrutinize this process. As presented above in the 
limitation section in this chapter we have chosen a period of time from 2006 up 
until today. During this period of time we will scrutinize changes in ideas and 
material capabilities. The changes found within these components will then 
become the indicators that will guide us when scrutinizing changes within 
institutions. To analyse this we will use secondary sources including academic 
articles and news paper articles to examine whether the changes in material 
capabilities and ideas have possibly influenced changes to prevail in the 
institutions.  
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5 Empirical findings and analysis 
In this chapter we will present our empirical findings and analyse them. The 
analysis will be done by scrutinizing changes in the operationalized versions of 
the theoretical concepts material capabilities, ideas and institutions. It is done for 
us to be able to answer the main research question; To what extent, and how, has 
the financial crisis triggered changes in the one of the main institutions governing 
development policies, the International Monetary Fund (the IMF)? 
 
5.1 Material capabilities 
In the method chapter the theoretical concept material capabilities was 
operationalized into three measurements; Gross Domestic Product, Balance of 
Payments, and Net trade. It was argued that for material capabilities to be 
regarded as changed there have to be significant changes in the three 
measurements presented above. Thus, in this chapter we will present the empirical 
findings for each and every one of the measurements and then analyse whether 
changes have prevailed in the material capabilities since the beginning of the 
current financial crisis. To do so we will scrutinize statistics from the G20 
countries1
 
. These countries are chosen since they are the ones, to a large extent 
governing the core actors in the thesis.  
The intention is as mentioned before to answer the sub-research question To 
what extent has the financial crisis triggered changes in the global economic 
architecture? When analysing the statistics we will concentrate on significant 
changes in the statistics for each country relative to the other countries. If there 
are major findings in this regard we will view this as changes in material 
capabilities between the different countries. To find out where the big changes are 
taking place we have gone through figures from all the G20 countries, the tables 
containing all the figures is to be found in the attachments. These detailed figures 
will not be presented further in the thesis. Instead we have chosen to show the 
major changes in diagrams in this chapter. For these diagrams we have chosen the 
five countries that show the most relative changes to other countries in the time 
frame of the thesis. Furthermore, these are countries given a lot of attention when 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 The G20 countries are; Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
South Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UK and US. 
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discussing changes in the global economic architecture. The chosen nations are; 
China, Germany, India, Russia and the US.  
 
Before presenting the statistics and analysing them, a few demarcations have 
to be made on the figures we have used. Our figures are from The IMF and 
OECD. The reason for choosing these sources is due to their credibility (coming 
from large international institutions) and their easy access (it is two of the rare 
places were it is possible to find the latest statistics from a large number of 
countries).  
 
IMF statistics  
The most recent figures from the IMF, the ones for 2009, are estimates. Since 
this is the case we need to be extra careful while drawing conclusions from these 
figures. Statistics from 2008 are the most accurate once published and are not 
estimates.  Despite of these differences we have decided to use estimates, since 
these are the only available statistics from this period of time. From the IMF we 
are using statistics on GDP and Balance of Payments. 
 
OECD statistics 
From the OECD we are using statistics on net trade. The OECD statistics are 
published monthly. The latest figures, where all nations are included, are from 
January 2009, thus it gives a possibility to look at the most recent changes in the 
statistics of the G20 nations. On the other hand the statistics do not include 
information on Argentina and Saudi Arabia. Thus, these nations are excluded 
from our analysis on material capabilities.  
5.1.1 Gross domestic Product - GDP 
GDP includes all goods and services produced within a nation during a specific 
period of time. It is used as an indicator of growth or deficit in a nation’s economy 
(www.investopedia.com).  
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Fig: 1 
 
Statistics from the IMF  
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/index.aspx, 04.2009) 
 
 
In the GDP statistics the year 2007 the figures show that 10 out of 17 G20 nations 
are experiencing lower GDP growth in percent compared to the year before. The 
most significant changes during that period of time, having the chosen countries 
in mind are that Russia and China are on the one hand among the countries facing 
an increased GDP growth. Germany, USA and India on the other hand are among 
the countries facing a negative GDP growth. Thus, in 2007 there seems to be a 
break in GDP growth for a number of countries, where other countries are still not 
experiencing this trend.  
 
In the year 2008 the figures show that all nations are experiencing a negative 
growth compared to the previous year. However, all nations, except Italy and 
Japan are having a positive GDP figure even though their GDP percent compared 
to the year before is declining. From this it could be argued that during 2007 and 
2008 there seems to be a break with the trend of increased GDP growth in all 
countries, however the decline struck countries like China and Russia later than 
countries like US, India and Germany. Possibly this could be due to the recession 
leading up to the financial crisis.   
 
The negative development continues in the year 2009 and Germany, the US and 
Russia are all facing high negative GDP growth rates, possibly it could be argued 
that the financial crisis is now shown in the GDP figures. Another interesting part 
GDP – Annual % change (2006-2009) 
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of the GDP estimates for 2009 are that China and India are continuing having a 
positive GDP figure even though their GDP percent compared to the year before 
is declining. Thus, here is a major different in material capabilities between the 
chosen five countries, where China and India are advancing their material 
capabilities relatively those of Germany, US and Russia. 
 
Concluding our finding in the GDP statistics section there are a major change 
in 2009 where the material capabilities are changing in favour of China and India. 
There is also an overall pattern in the diagram above where the highest GDP 
growth rate is shown to be in China, India and Russia. Thus, it is possible that the 
financial crisis has left the US, Germany and Russia with weakened material 
capabilities compared to China and India. Furthermore, China and India also seem 
to have stronger material capabilities during the whole chosen period of time.   
5.1.2  Balance of payments 
Balance of payments is the sum of credit inflow and outflow in a specific period 
of time to and from a specific nation. When balance of payments is negative it 
means that more assets are moving out of the country than into the country, the 
opposite is true when the balance of payments is positive 
(www.investopedia.com). Balance of payments is an interesting measurement to 
take into account when discussing counter-cyclical policies. Since this issue has 
been discussed widely after the outbreak of the financial crisis it will be analysed 
here. If a country has a balances Balance of Payments (over 0) it is argued in the 
debate that it gives a larger room to undertake counter-cyclical policies.  
 
The following table includes data on balance of payments in the chosen five G20 
countries. The data is in billions of US dollars and is from 2006 to 2009. The data 
from 2009 are estimated by the IMF. 
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Fig: 2 
 
 
Statistics from the IMF  
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/index.aspx, 
15.04.2009) 
 
 
According to IMF statistics from the years 2006 and 2007 some of the G20 
nations where experiencing a deficit in balance of payments. That includes for 
instance the USA, United Kingdom and France. China and Germany, on the other 
hand where experiencing positive balance of payments in these years.  
 
When scrutinizing statistics for the years 2007 and 2008 they show changes in 
negative directions where most G20 nations where experiencing a decline in 
balance of payments from the year 2007 to the year 2008.  Russia and China, on 
the other hand have an increased balance of payments in 2008 compared to the 
year before. India on the other hand experienced a decrease in balance of 
payments. The USA continued having a negative balance of payments, however 
its negative figures decreased from 2007 to 2008. 
 
In 2009 Chinas balance of payments continues being positive. The positive 
balance of Germany is estimated to decrease in 2009 and in the case of Russia 
decrease in 2009 compared to being positive from 2006 – 2008. The IMF 
estimates that the USA will decrease its’ negative balance from -673.266 to - 
Current Account Balance (2006-2009) 
  34 
393.250, which is a more positive change than during 2007 and 2008. That is also 
the case with India which is estimated to decrease its’ negative balance during 
2009.  
 
Since 2006 there has been a steady positive increase in Chinas´ balance of 
payments with more credits entering the Chinese economy than going out. On the 
contrary, the US has had a negative balance of payments. However, the US deficit 
is declining from 2008. During 2008 and 2009 India, Germany and Russia are 
experiencing a decrease in their balance of payments. 
 
The main conclusion according to fig; 3 is that China and USA are the only 
nations improving their balance of payments. USA is continuing its’ balance 
negative when China continues showing increasing figures. From this it could be 
argued that China, one more is the country showing the overall most positive 
patterns in the case of balance of payments. Thus, we argue that the Chinese 
material capabilities have become stronger relatively to the other countries being 
examined. In relation to the financial crisis it could be argued that the decrease 
shown in a majority of countries from 2008 could be related to the crisis. During 
this time, however, China and the US seem to be able to advance their inflows of 
assets in times of crisis relatively to other countries, thus strengthening their 
material capabilities.   
5.1.3 Net trade 
Net trade explains the balance between export and import of a nation during a 
specific period of time. A positive net trade is a surplus of export relative to 
import and a negative net trade is accordingly a smaller export than import.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig: 3 
Statistics from the OECD 
http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Index.aspx?datasetcode=MEI_TRD 
Kommentar [hs1]: Drop this bef 
Kommentar [hs2R1]:  
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When scrutinizing major changes in net trade during the chosen period of time 
no major changes could be shown in the statistics until October 2008 
(unfortunately the dates on the x-axis in the table are unclear in the diagram, but 
the dates could be seen at the original source for the diagram 
http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Index.aspx?datasetcode=MEI_TRD). From this time 
the figures show an increase in net trade for China and the US. The overall pattern 
for the five countries in the diagram is that the US and India are the countries that 
shows a net trade deficit, the US one being much more significant. As was states 
for the two other measurements for material capabilities, China is ones more 
showing a stronger overall pattern compared to the other countries. Thus, it could 
be argued that the Chinese material capabilities are stronger than those of other 
countries. There is a significant change regarding this after the outbreak of the 
financial crisis suggesting that Chinas material capabilities have been strengthen 
after the financial crisis. However, this is also the case for the US. 
5.1.4 Concluding changes in material capabilities 
 
To make an overall summary on our findings of changes in material capabilities it 
could be concluded that the only country strengthening its material capabilities in 
all the measurements is China. The country is showing the highest GDP growth 
and is also the country, so far, facing the least GDP decrease during the financial 
crisis. Furthermore, China is the one country showing the overall most positive 
patterns in the case of balance of payments and has been able to advance its 
inflows of assets in times of crisis relatively to other countries (except relative the 
US). The same pattern is true for net trade where China and the US are the two 
countries increasing their net trade during the crisis. Thus, the significant change 
in term of material capabilities is that China is advancing its material capabilities 
relative to other countries. 
 
5.2 Ideas 
In the method chapter the theoretical concept ideas was operationalized. As 
stated before the interesting part of the idea concept was the collective images. 
The other kind of ideas, intersubjective meanings will only be mentioned shortly 
at the end of this section. The collective images were operationlized by 
identifying a set of indicators to look for in the empirical material. The indicators 
were grouped in ideological issues and governance issues. To remind the reader, 
the indicators we will use are; 
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Ideological issues 
- Tensing policies or counter-cyclical spending in times of recession and 
crisis 
- Level of state-intervention (bail-outs from states to private actors, 
nationalization of private institutes, guarantees set by governments on 
private credit flows etc) 
- Inequalities to be addressed in development policies or trickle-down when 
the elite increases their assets 
- Openness to trade 
 
Governance issues  
- Conserving, reforming or creating alternative global institutions to the 
IMF (with focus issues relating to policy space, more funding to IMF, 
more impact for emerging economies and developing countries)  
 
Furthermore, the empirical material was also outlined in the method chapter. It 
was said that we would use key documents from our core actors from the debate 
on development policies. The timeframe was set from the second part of 2006 
until April this year. With this background we will go through our empirical 
findings year by year for the chosen period to answer the sub-research question; 
To what extent has the financial crisis triggered changes in the debate on 
development policies? It was stated in the method chapter that if there have been 
changes in the core actor’s point of views regarding the above mentioned 
indicators, we will regard the collective images as changed.  
 
To make it easier to capture the main empirical findings from of the collective 
images in the debate on development policies among the core actors a table has 
been set up below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  37 
 
 
 
 
 
2006 
 
 
2007 
 
 
2008 
 
 
2009 
 
 
IMF 
September 
Openness to 
trade 
- Openness to 
trade is important 
in emerging 
economies and in 
developing 
countries 
April 
Openness to 
trade 
- Openness to 
trade important in 
emerging 
economies and in 
developing 
countries 
October 
Inequalities to be 
addressed 
directly or trickle 
down 
- Inequalities 
should be 
addressed by FDI 
that will 
eventually trickle 
down to low-
income groups 
but should also be 
addressed directly 
by pro-poor 
lending 
April  
Pro-cyclicality or 
counter-
cyclicality 
- Countries with 
large external 
financial needs 
need to tighten 
their policies.  
October 
- Same statement 
as above 
March – April 
Pro-cyclicality or 
counter-
cyclicality 
- Same statement 
as during 2008 
Reforming the 
IFIs 
- Small changes 
in conditionalities 
when new lending 
package was 
introduced for a 
small number of 
countries 
Level of state 
intervention 
- State support 
may be warranted 
in some cases 
Openness to 
trade 
- Increasing 
global trade is 
important 
 
 
G20 
November 
Reforming the 
IFIs 
- Important to 
review quotas, 
more 
representation 
should be given to 
emerging 
economies 
- The selection 
process for the 
managing 
director should 
be an open 
process  
November 
List of welfare 
and infrastructure 
spending in the 
member 
countries, no 
overall policies 
for the G20 
November 
Reforming the 
IFIs 
- Expand the 
IMF-budget 
- IMF should 
strengthen their 
micro-finance 
polices advices 
- G20 states its 
support for the 
IMF review of its 
lending policies 
- Reform quotas, 
more 
representation 
should be given to 
emerging 
economies and 
for developing 
countries 
Pro-cyclicality or 
counter-
March - April 
Reforming the 
IFIs 
- Continued 
support for IMF 
as the institution 
to govern 
monetary and 
financial issues 
- Trebled support 
to the IMF from 
G20 countries 
- The conditioned 
loans to 
developing 
countries should 
increase 
- IMF should 
provide further 
policy advices 
- The G20 
welcomes 
changes 
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cyclicality 
- Strongly against 
cyclicality 
- Support should 
only be given to 
countries with 
good track 
records for them 
to be able to 
undertake 
counter-cyclical 
policies 
undertaken by 
IMF on 
conditionalities  
- Important to 
review quotas, 
more 
representation 
should be given to 
emerging 
economies 
- The selection 
process for the 
managing 
director should 
be an open 
process 
 
 
Crisis 
Commission 
 
Crisis 
Commission not 
yet established 
 
Crisis 
Commission not 
yet established 
October 
 Level of state 
intervention 
- States its 
support for part-
nationalisation 
Pro-cyclicality or 
counter-
cyclicality and 
Inequalities to be 
addressed 
directly or trickle 
down 
- Counter-cyclical 
polices should be 
undertaken and 
should benefit 
low-income and 
medium-income 
groups  
 
 
January – 
March 
Pro-cyclicality or 
counter-
cyclicality 
- More counter-
cyclical policies 
should be 
undertaken 
Reforming the 
IFIs 
- Criticise IMF 
for its pro-
cyclical 
conditionalities 
- More 
representation for 
emerging 
economies and 
developing 
countries in IFIs 
- Mechanism 
within UN to be 
established to 
conduct 
independent 
analysis of global 
economic policies  
- A UN Global 
Economic 
Council should be 
established 
equivalent to the 
UN Security 
Council 
- More funding to 
existing IFIs or to 
alternative 
institutions  
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Table outlining the empirical findings of collective images. 
5.2.1 Features of the debate in 2006 
In the debate during 2006 none of the core actors present at the time (the crisis 
commission was not yet founded) saw any signs of a prevailing financial crisis 
and the world in general was experiencing growth, the G20 even argues that “the 
outlook remains positive” (G20 communiqué for Melbourne meeting 11.06). In 
the World Economic Outlook (WEO) from the IMF in September 2006 much 
emphasis was put on the importance of openness to trade in emerging and 
developing countries. By further opening up, it was argued that the emerging and 
developing countries would be able to further boost their economic growth. In 
these “good times” the WEO did not discuss how to spend or save to balance the 
business cycle, neither did it discuss level of state-intervention or how to address 
inequalities. We did not find any policy documents discussing a possible reform 
of the IMF (World Economic Outlook, 09.2006: xiv-xv, 90ff). 
 
On the other hand, when reading a discussion paper from the G20 in 
preparation for the G20 meeting in Melbourne as well as the communiqué from 
the Melbourne meeting in November 2006 a lot of focus was put on the fact that 
the IMF and the World Bank had recently agreed on reviewing the quotas hold by 
the member states in the IFIs. A will was expressed in the agreement to expand 
the impact of emerging economies in the IFIs for the institutions to better reflect 
the global economic architecture prevailing at the time. Furthermore the 
agreement also promised to enhance the voice of low-income countries. The G20 
stated its support for such an agreement. Furthermore the G20 also repeated its 
position on reviewing the selection of senior management for both the IMF and 
the World Bank. The G20 stated that the positions should be appointed “based on 
merit and ensure a fully transparent process for the selection of the IMF 
Managing Director and the World Bank President (G20 communiqué for 
Melbourne meeting, 11.06: 4). Except for the discussion outlined above on 
reforming IFIs none of the other indicators were discussed at this time (Parkinson, 
10.2006, G20 communiqué for Melbourne meeting, 11.2006).      
 
5.2.2 Features of the debate in 2007 
In the April 2007 World Economic Outlook there were still nothing mentioned 
on a possible prevailing crisis, on the contrary emphasis was put on not to 
overheat emerging economies and advising them to save if the good times where 
to disappear. In this sense on could argue that the IMF were advising emerging 
economies to take counter-cyclical actions, although the wordings are quite vague. 
In accordance to the WEO from September 2006 liberalising trade in emerging 
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economies and finishing the Doha Round2
 
 was still given a lot of space in the 
WEO from April 2007 (World Economic Outlook, 04.2007: 33ff).     
In the October 2007 World Economic Outlook weaker growth prospects were 
said to be prevailing for advanced economies. However, it was stated that a 
number of emerging economies still were facing pressures of overheating. Thus, 
IMF advised these countries to undertake measures to tightening monetary and 
fiscal policies (World Economic Outlook, 10.2007: 38, 112). In the October 2007 
WEO inequalities is given a complete section in the report were an empirical 
investigation is done to scrutinize the implication of globalization to (in)equality. 
Even though the empirical findings suggests that Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDIs) increases the level of inequality in the shorter run, it is argued that the 
reverse will happen over a longer period of time if emphasis are put on educating 
un-skilled labour. Thus, the IMF is not advising to cut FDIs. Taking this into 
account it could be argued that the IMF is putting forward a position were the 
FDIs are said to eventually trickle down to low-income groups, but the 
inequalities are not to be addressed directly. On the other hand, it is argued in the 
same section that measures should be taken to improve institutions that promote 
“pro-poor lending”. This could be argued to be a direct policy advice to combat 
inequality (World Economic Outlook, 10.2007: 159ff).  
 
In the communiqué from the G20 meeting in November 2007 in Kleinmond, 
South Africa the agreed action were said to be implemented to sustain the growth. 
No signs of fear for prevailing crisis could be seen in the communiqué. Neither 
does the communiqué put any emphasis on common policy measures. The 
communiqué is rather a list of well fare and infrastructure spending in the 
different member countries. Since the recession was still to come in most of the 
member countries these measures could be viewed as pro-cyclical. In some 
member countries inequality was said to be combated through expanding social 
policies (Communiqué from G20 meeting in Kleimond, 11.2007).        
 
Neither level of state-intervention nor openness to trade was discussed in the 
reports from G20 and the IMF. Furthermore, reforming the IMF were no longer 
discussed in the reports and no achievements on this regard were noted 
(Communiqué from G20 meeting in Kleimond, 11.2007, World Economic 
Outlook 10.2007, World Economic Outlook 04.2007).  
 
5.2.3 Features of the debate in 2008 
In the April 2008 World Economic Outlook the IMF starts talking about a 
financial crisis. It is argued that many emerging economies have more room for 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 The latest negotiation round in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
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counter-cyclical measures in case the financial crisis becomes global. However, it 
is also stated that for those countries that still have large external financing needs 
might need to tighten their policies. This is to say that the IMF position is that 
counter-cyclical policies are good as long as the countries pay for them 
themselves, but if it takes external financers (e.g. the IMF) to be able to take such 
measures the advice is, on the contrary, to tighten policies and thus make them 
pro-cyclical. The argument here from the IMF is that in countries with high level 
of dependency of external financers and large current account deficits it is more 
important to build up the credibility for the economy than to take counter-cyclical 
measures. It is also argued that tightening measures should be taken in some cases 
for the inflation to be kept at a moderate level. The discussion in the October 2008 
World Economic Outlook a similar discussion is outlined regarding counter-
cyclical policies. It is also stated that counter-cyclical measures are good as long 
as they take into account medium-term stability. In both the WEO from October 
2008 fiscal counter-cyclical policies are generally said to be more effective than 
monetary counter-cyclical policies in emerging economies (World Economic 
Outlook, 04.2008: 38ff, World Economic Outlook, 10.2008: 37ff, 110ff, 183).     
 
The communiqué from the G20 meeting in Sao Paulo in November in 2008 is 
again a list of measurements that is being conducted by the different member 
countries. Overall a lot of emphasis is put on stabilising the financial sector, even 
though for most member countries the exact actions taken are not explicitly 
presented. In the emerging economies the focus is also on infrastructural spending 
and expanded social polices to improve income distribution. Even though it is not 
an overall strategy for the G20 to conduct counter-cyclical policies, in practice 
that is what the single member countries are doing. Several emerging economies 
are also conducting social polices to combat inequalities (Communiqué from G20 
meeting in Sao Paulo 11.2008). 
 
Later the same month, in November 2008, the G20 met for a new meeting. 
This time the meeting was to solely discuss the financial crisis and the 
international cooperation need to combat the crisis. The communiqué from this 
meeting was not a list of the different member countries economic policies, but a 
common paper on actions needed to combat the financial crisis. The report has 
two main focuses; to reform the IFIs, especially the IMF and to promote counter-
cyclical policies (Communiqué from G20 meeting in Washington 11.2008). 
 
The G20 recognises the importance of the IFIs, in particular the IMF, to 
provide critical support for the global economy, especially to emerging and 
developing countries. The G20 also recognises that there might be a need to 
expand the budget of the IMF and that they are wiling to contribute to increase it 
if necessary. The G20 also states its support for the review conducted by the IMF 
to make the lending more flexible. Furthermore, the G20 again calls for the IMF 
to reform its representation and give more room to emerging economies and 
developing countries. It is also stated in the G20 meeting report that the IMF 
should strengthen their macro-finance policy advices. By saying this the G20 is 
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stating that they support the IMF in their role of advising governments what do 
and what not to do, rather than encouraging the IMF to reform in order to give 
governments more policy space (Communiqué from G20 meeting in Washington 
11.2008: 1ff).    
 
In the report the G20 positions them selves strongly against pro-cyclical 
polices in a situation of crisis and recession. On several sections in the report they 
state that they will mitigate against pro-cyclical policies (see for example p. 2, 4 
and 5 in the communiqué from the Washington meeting). Furthermore, the G20 
argues that in countries without their own reserves to conduct counter-cyclical 
measures, IFIs must ensure that support can be given to take these kinds of 
actions. However, the G20 is stating that for a country to achieve this kind of 
support it has to have a good track record and sound policies. It is not explained 
more explicitly what this means, but since sound policies is normative wording, it 
might in practice tend to follow what the G20 views as sound policies. Thus, there 
is a risk that the support given would be followed by certain conditionalities 
(Communiqué from G20 meeting in Washington 11.2009: 2ff).      
 
Since the UN Commission of Experts on Reforms of the International 
Monetary and Financial System (also referred to as the Crisis Commission in the 
thesis) was not founded until October 2008 the first documents from it is a speech 
held by one of its experts for the UN General Assembly at the 30th
5.2.4 Features of the debate in 2009 
 of October in 
2008. In the speech the member of the Crisis Commission, Prabhat Patnaik, 
argues that it is not enough that governments inject liquidity, but they should also 
part-nationalise financial institutions. Furthermore, Pratnaik is arguing that 
counter-cyclical spending should be aimed at “ordinary people” to both combat 
inequality and to boost demand (Patnaik 30.10.2008 UN General Assembly).   
In January the Crisis Commission issued a document reflecting their key 
perspectives. In this document the Crisis Commission states the importance of an 
active state to combat the market current failures (Key perspectives from the UN 
Commission of Experts on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial 
System 13.01.2009). Furthermore the Crisis Commission states that developing 
countries have been forced to pursue pro-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies. 
Thus, countries dependent on external borrowing to finance a deficit may find it 
impossible to get support from IFIs during a regression. This could of course be 
seen as criticism to IFI. In two more documents from the Crisis Commission from 
January 2009 on Principles for a new Financial Architecture and 
Recommendations for Immediate Action the commission again argues for the 
importance of counter-cyclical policies. Moreover, the Crisis Commission 
recognises the need for more funding internationally to support countries in need 
and argues that there are few incentives for emerging countries to contribute to 
this by supplying money to IFIs. This is due to the lack of representation the 
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emerging economies are experiencing in these institutions, the commission 
argues. Even though the IFIs themselves have noted deficiencies in their 
governance structure, the Crisis Commission argues that reforms have been slow 
and limited. Furthermore, the Crisis Commission argues that the IFIs pushed 
developing countries to conduct policy reforms such as deregulations, policies 
that are now seen as the heart of the financial crisis. This undermine the 
legitimacy of the IFIs if they are not undertaking radical reforms or if new 
institutions are created, the commission concludes (Recommendations for 
Immediate Action from the UN Commission of Experts on Reforms of the 
International Monetary and Financial System 04.01.2009-06.01.2009, Key 
perspectives from the UN Commission of Experts on Reforms of the International 
Monetary and Financial System 13.01.2009, Principles for a New Financial 
Architecture from the UN Commission of Experts on Reforms of the International 
Monetary and Financial System 13.01.2009).      
 
At the G20 meeting in Washington in November 2008 four working groups 
were founded, one of them with the task to scrutinize possibilities to reform the 
IMF. In March 2009 the working group issued its final report. In the report the 
G20 stated the continually importance of the IMF governing monetary and 
financial issues. For the IMF to better fulfil its mandate, most of the G20 member 
countries will double their support to the IMF. However, the G20 also notes that 
the financial crisis has highlighted the need for reforming the institution. The G20 
calls for the package of quota and voice changes agreed by the IMF in April 2008 
to be ratified. Furthermore, the G20 calls for a new review of the quotas and for 
this review to take into account the changes in global economics, i.e. for the 
emerging economies to be better represented in the IMF. It is also stated in the 
G20 report that some of the member countries will to support the IMF was 
conditional on the review taking place. Moreover, the report notes the importance 
of an open and merit-based selection process when the new Management Director 
of the IMF is being appointed. The G20 also wants to extend the IMFs ability to 
provide loans to low-income countries. However, the loans will be followed by 
conditionalities. The G20 also wants to strengthen the surveillance role of the IMF 
and wants the IMF to give further policy advices and for governance to be more 
responsive to the IMF surveillance (G20 Working Group 3: Reform of the IMF, 
Final Report 03.2009: 1ff). 
 
In the communiqué from the G20 meeting of Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors later in March 2009 some the reforms of the IMF suggested by 
the working group was confirmed. It is stated in the communiqué that the quota 
and voice changes agreed by the IMF in April 2008 should be “swiftly 
implemented” and that the Management Director of the IMF should be appointed 
though an open and merit-based selection process (Communiqué from G20 
meeting in United Kingdom 03.2009).   
 
A few days after the above mentioned G20 meeting in the UK, the Crisis 
Commission issued their main document, their recommendations on how to 
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combat the financial crisis. In the recommendation a lot of emphasis is put on 
reforming the IMF, for example it is stated that the institution needs to be 
profoundly reformed to meet the current financial needs. Furthermore, the 
commission argues that there is a need for a new credit facility for distribution of 
additional funding. The commission notes that the fastest way for the facility to be 
established is for it to be under the existing IFIs if they are undertaking reform. 
Another option would be to place it under Regional Development Banks. The 
Commission encourage alternative institutions to the traditional IFIs to be 
established to achieve competition among the lenders. What ever form is chosen, 
the commission argues for the need to give strong representation to developing 
countries as well as emerging economies. The Management Director of the IMF 
should also be appointed through an open and democratic selection process 
(Recommendations from the UN Commission of Experts on Reforms of the 
International Monetary and Financial System, 03.2009: 1, 7ff).  
 
Moreover, the commission recommend that a mechanism within the UN 
system is established to conduct independent international analysis on questions 
of global economic policy which would also include social and environmental 
dimensions. This “panel” would comprise both academics and representatives for 
social movements. Along with this the commission also suggest the creation of a 
UN Global Economic Council, equivalent to the UN Security Council. The IFIs 
and UN bodies dealing with economic and social issues would provide 
information and participate in the council (Recommendations from the UN 
Commission of Experts on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial 
System, 03.2009: 10.12).    
 
In the report, the Crisis Commission also states the inappropriateness of 
conditionality attached to IMF loans and argues that developing countries should 
get more policy space for them to decide themselves what policies are good for 
their country and to be able to conduct counter-cyclical policies. The Commission 
blames the IFIs for imposing pro-cyclical policies on developing countries, while 
developed countries are able to undertake counter-cyclical measures. Furthermore, 
the commission argues that the pro-cyclical measures imposed on the developing 
countries by the IFIs are the once contributing to the financial crisis. The 
Commission welcomes the initiatives taken by the IMF to reduce conditionalities, 
however they state that they might be insufficient since many countries are still 
required to undertake pro-cyclical policies. Finally the Crisis Commission also 
states the importance of an active state to regulate market failures 
(Recommendations from the UN Commission of Experts on Reforms of the 
International Monetary and Financial System, 03.2009: 4-7, 17).  
 
A few days after the recommendations were issues from the Crisis 
Commission the IMF issued a paper on lending policy improvements. These were 
said to be a response to the deep global economic difficulties and to help 
developing countries get the room for policy manoeuvre to get out of the 
recession. It is also stated in the paper that the new lending policy improvements 
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have been developed through consultations with members of the IMF and other 
stakeholders. Discussed through the paper are changes in the conditionalities. The 
paper admits that in the past the IMF has had too many and insufficient 
conditionalities attached to lending packages. The attached conditionalities will 
now be more flexible. For countries with good records the so called Flexible 
Credit Lines (FCL) will be introduced. To these FCLs no conditionalities will be 
attached. However, countries that do not qualify for the FCLs still face 
conditioned lending packages. The largest change here is that the less reviews on 
the countries policy actions will be carried through by the IMF. The IMF is also 
considering modifications in the conditionalities attached to loans for low income 
countries. A lot of focus is put on the FCL and is put forward as an argument in 
the discussion on conditionalities. The FCL is said to reform the IMF lending by 
reducing the conditionalities attached. While it is true for those countries that gain 
access to the FCLs, the largest number of countries lending from the IMF does not 
gain this access. In fact, so far, only three countries have been approved to lend 
within the FCL; Poland, Colombia and Mexico. The largest share of lending is 
instead within The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility programmes (PRGF). 
No major changes has been made within these programmes (IMF paper: IMF 
implements major lending policy improvements 24.03.2009, IMF Fact sheet on 
The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 13.05.2009, IMF Fact sheet on IMF 
Lending 13.05.2009).      
 
In the World Economic Outlook from April 2009 the IMF states that in times 
of regression monetary counter-cyclical policies are more useful than fiscal ones. 
However, in financial crisis the reverse is true. It is then stated that fiscal policies 
are more efficient and that monetary policies are not statistically significant. 
However, the IMF notes that financial policies are less efficient when the public 
indeptness is high. Thus, the IMF argues that if financial polices are to be 
undertaken, it is crucial that it is done in a context of fiscal sustainability. For 
countries with large current account deficits, the IMF is advising to take pro-
cyclical measures and tighten their monetary policies (World Economic Outlook, 
04.2009: 42, 119-121, 160). 
 
A lot of space is dedicated to discuss the effectiveness of counter-cyclical 
policies, however a few other things are noted.  In some countries the IMF notes 
that state support may be warranted, for example by governments supporting 
credit flows by issuing guarantees and direct government borrowing for 
corporations. The IMF also calls for more money to the IFIs and encourage 
policies to increase global trade (World Economic Outlook, 04.2009: 38ff, 160). 
 
In the G20s latest communiqué, the one from the government leaders meeting 
in London in April 2009 once more focus was put on reforming IFIs and 
conducting counter-cyclical policies. The G20 promised to treble the resources 
available to the IMF to be able to help emerging economies and developing 
countries to conduct counter-cyclical policies through loans given by the 
institution. G20 also welcomes the new Flexible Credit Line (FCL) introduced by 
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the IMF and discussed above. Furthermore, G20 once more stated that they will 
work to reform the mandate and governance of the IFIs to better reflect the global 
economic situation. The emerging economies as well as developing countries 
were promised to be given more voice and representation within the institutions. 
The G20 stated its commitment to implement the IMF quota reform from April 
2008 and called at the same time on the IMF to complete the new review of 
quotas by January 2011. Moreover, it was stated once more that the management 
director of the IMF was to be appointed through an open and merit-based 
selection process (Communiqué from G20 London meeting 04.2009).   
 
5.2.5 Concluding the discussion – have changes in ideas prevailed in 
the light of the financial crisis? 
 
From the empirical examination outlined above one can see that the debate in the 
light of the financial crisis starts in early 2008 among the core actors. Before that 
change the debate was mainly about trade liberalisation and reforming the IFIs. 
On the contrary, after the debate a lot of focus was put on conducting counter-
cyclical policies. However, the discussion on reforming the IMF continued. While 
the Crisis Commission entered the debate in late 2008 it shifts the focus in the 
debate to also include the need for state-intervention to correct market failures. 
However, this never becomes a big issue. The issue of inequalities is given a bit 
more space in the debate. The IMF is both arguing for trickle-down effects to 
address the issue and for direct measures to combat inequalities. This is done in 
2007, i.e. before the core actors starts wording that a financial crisis is prevailing. 
The Crisis Commission argues for direct actions on the issue and is the only actor 
that gives space to the issue after the crisis. Thus, the issues of inequalities do not 
get much attention in the debate after the financial crisis. The two main issues in 
the debate is instead on counter-cyclical polices and reforming the IFIs.      
 
The Crisis Commission argues for specific counter-cyclical measures aiming 
at “ordinary people” to both combat inequalities and to boost demand. The 
commission does not state any differences in undertaking counter-cyclical 
measures between developed and developing countries, but rather argues that it is 
needed in all countries. The IMF on the other hand argues for counter-cyclical 
policies to be carried through only in countries with good fiscal sustainability and 
with no current account deficits. For countries not fulfilling those conditions, 
tightening policies need to be conducted. Thus, the IMF argues for pro-cyclicality 
in many cases. The Crisis Commission welcomes the IMF review of 
conditionalities attacked to lending packages, however the commission consider 
the reform to be insufficient since it only complies with a limited number of 
countries. The G20 positions it selves somewhere in the middle by saying that 
counter-cyclical measures need to be conducted. However, G20 also states its 
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support to the different IMF lending programs, some of them with attached 
conditionalities that forces countries to undertake pro-cyclical policies.  
 
To conclude possible changes regarding pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical 
measures no major changes seems to have prevailed. One might say that the 
debate after the financial crisis have put more focus than before on counter-
cyclical policies, however the positions of the IMF and the G20 does not seem to 
be profoundly changed. The IMF is still arguing for pro-cyclicality for a large 
number of developing countries and in practice, from September 2008 until 
January 2009 the nine crisis packages issued by the IMF are all including 
tightening of the budget equivalent to 1-3 percentage of the countries´ GDP 
(Hermele 2009:18). The only change in the debate on this matter is the alternative 
view put forward by the Crisis Commission, strongly arguing for counter-cyclical 
policies to be undertaken regardless of current account deficits.  
 
Apart from the counter-cyclical policies the other big issues discussed both 
before and after the crisis is the issue of reforming the IMF. Already in 2006 the 
G20 argued that a review of the quotas need to be undertaken and that the 
selection process for the appointment of the senior manager must be done through 
an open and merit-based process. In 2007 no focus was put on the issue in the 
documents from the core actors, but in 2008 the issue is back on the G20 agenda. 
The issues for reforming representation for emerging economies were stated once 
more. The G20 also argued for increasing the support to the IMF and welcomed 
the review undertaken by the IMF to make the lending more flexible. The G20 
also wanted the IMF to strengthen their macro-financial policy advices. Finally 
G20 argued that the IMF should only give countries with good track records and 
sound policies the possibility to undertake counter-cyclical measures.  
 
In 2009 the G20 repeated the same reform measures to be undertaken and 
added that a new review of the representation in the IMF should be ended in 2011. 
Furthermore, the G20 promised to treble their support to the IMF-budget. The 
Crisis Commission strongly argued for profound reforms of the IFIs. The 
emerging countries and developing countries must be better represented in the 
IFIs,   otherwise there is a risk that they will not contribute to the funding of the 
institutions. The commission also argues that a new credit facility need to 
distribute additional funding, this could be done either through the IFIs or through 
alternative institutions. The commission puts strong criticism to the IFIs and apart 
from the G20 they are supporting alternative institutions to be created. In 
accordance to this they also suggest the creation of an independent UN panel of 
experts on global economic policies including social and environmental 
dimensions and a UN Global Economic Council (similar to the UN Security 
Council). 
 
To conclude the debate on reforming the IFIs, especially the IMF it is clear 
that the issue was debated already in 2006, before the crisis. However, in the light 
of the crisis more emphasis have been but on reforming the IFIs. The G20 
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positions themselves in a more moderate position in this debate, agreeing with the 
measures undertaken by the IMF, while the Crisis Commission calls for more 
radical changes of the IFIs and also calls for a creation of new ones. After the 
outbreak of the financial crisis the G20 has also expanded its contribution to the 
IMF heavily.   
         
To conclude the analysis on whether the collective images have changed in the 
debate, more emphasis have been put on contra-cyclical policies, however no 
clear changes in the positions of the IMF and the G20 in this regard could be 
noted. What is new after the financial crisis is the Crisis Commission entering the 
debate and arguing strongly for counter-cyclical policies to be conducted.  
 
The other big issue in the debate was on reforming the IMF. Here, our 
empirical findings suggest that already before the crisis there was a debate on 
reforming the IMF, however it was strengthen in the light of the financial crisis. 
The budget support from the G20 countries to the IMF was also strengthen after 
the outbreak of the financial crisis. From this we can conclude that pretty small 
changes in collective images have prevailed in the light of the financial crisis.  
 
Going back to the theoretical model to the other kind of idea - the 
intersubjective meanings, it can also be noted from the debate that all the core 
actors have a common ground that neither of them has questioned. Given that 
none of the core actors seem to argue against a capitalist system we conclude that 
the current system is an intersubjective meaning shared by all the core actors. 
5.3 Institutions 
When institutions were operationalized in the method chapter it was stated that 
institutions are the forum for interaction between the components of the world 
order. From the theoretical model it was also argued that one cannot predict how 
the interaction between the components will prevail in reality, it is to be 
scrutinized within every specific case. Thus, we will have to turn to the empirical 
material to scrutinize the last sub-research question; How has the new economic 
architecture and the new ideas arising from the financial crisis possibly changed 
the International Monetary Fund (the IMF)? To be able to do so we have gone 
through a large number of academic articles and news paper articles. To scrutinize 
institutional change we need to remember the findings from the two components 
material capabilities and ideas since these findings will interact within the 
institution to achieve institutional change. Thus, we will first make a short review 
of our findings of changes in material capabilities and in ideas. 
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5.3.1 Main findings of changes in material capabilities 
The most significant finding is that the material capabilities of China have been 
more productive (to use Cox wordings) than in the other countries during the 
period of time examine in the thesis. This is evident for example by the Chinas 
relatively higher increase in GDP than in other countries. Furthermore, China is 
the one country showing the least decrease in GDP growth during the financial 
crisis. The same pattern is true for Balance of payments as well as for Net trade, 
where China has been able to advance its inflows of assets and increased the its 
net trade (except relative the US) during the crisis. What could be concluded is 
that China has an advantage to the other countries since it has managed to 
maintain its strong material capabilities from before the crisis also during the 
crisis. Furthermore, since Chinas material capabilities are relatively stronger than 
those of other countries during times of recession it could also be argued that the 
crisis could possibly be viewed as a window of opportunity for China to advance 
its position as a big global player, generally possibly also affecting the debate on 
development policies. However, when discussing the increased productive 
material capabilities of China we also need to take into account that the financial 
crisis might not yet have reach its top in China. Possibly, China will be more 
severely affected than noted so far. If so, the significance of the above mentioned 
indicators of course decreases (Thirlwell, 2009: 8). 
5.3.2 Main findings of changes in collective images 
In the discussion on ideas it was stated that the changes in the debate all 
occurred in the kind of ideas called collective images. It was argued that more 
emphasis has been put on contra-cyclical policies after the outbreak of the crisis, 
however no clear changes in the positions of the IMF and the G20 in this regard 
could be noted. What is new after the financial crisis is that the Crisis 
Commission entered the debate and argued strongly for counter-cyclical policies 
to be conducted.  
 
The other big issue in the debate was on reforming the IMF. Here, our 
empirical findings suggested that already before the crisis there was a debate on 
reforming the IMF, however it was strengthen in the light of the financial crisis. In 
accordance to this, Thirlwell also argues that the debate in the light of the 
financial crisis has rather put emphasis on reforms that were already underway, 
more than proposing new ones (Thirlwell, 2009:9).  Again, the work of the Crisis 
Commission helped the issue to move higher up on the agenda. The issue in focus 
in the debate on reforming IFIs was to give more representation to emerging 
economies and developing countries. In the debate, it was argued that this must be 
done for the IFIs to better reflect the current global economic architecture, i.e. 
were the emerging economies have gained more economic influence. Moreover, 
after the outbreak of the financial crisis the G20 countries expanded their 
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contribution to the IMF heavily. Apart from this it was concluded that pretty small 
changes in collective images have prevailed in the light of the financial crisis.  
 
5.3.3 The interaction of the three components 
 
When we went through the articles for this section we found out that there were 
two main tendencies of institutional change within the IMF. One argues that 
emerging economies will get more influence in existing institutions such as the 
IMF and the other one argues that emerging economies will create alternative 
institutions collaterally to existing institutions like the IMF. These two tendencies 
will be presented in their extreme formation in this section. However, the real 
world is probably more complex and nuanced than in the extreme formations. 
Thus, varieties to them are discussed at the end of the section.    
 
More influence for emerging economies within existing institutions 
A number of commentators call for China and in some cases also other emerging 
economies to take action to boost global economic growth. When this is argued 
the commentators also put forward that these countries must be given more 
influence in international institutions (see for example Boughton & Bradford 
12.2008). We saw from the idea section that a lot of emphasis in the debate on 
development policies where put on reforming IFIs and to give more representation 
to emerging economies and developing countries. It was argued that this must be 
done for the IFIs to better reflect the current global economic architecture, i.e. 
where primarily China has advanced its material capabilities. This could be seen 
as the material capabilities, the collective images and the institutions interacting. 
In this case it could be argued that the increased material capabilities of China 
enables the country to take action to boost global economy which results in new 
collective images in the debate in term of more representation for emerging 
economies within the institutions (Wade 2009). In accordance to this Rodrik 
argues that emerging economies will come out of this crisis with a greater 
influence in IFIs. Rodrik continues to argue that this is due to the fact that the 
financial crisis has weakened western countries and these countries will be 
unwilling to provide the leadership that has been the case up until now. He argues 
that developing countries will have to fill that gap (Zoellick 25.01.2009, Rodrik 
01.2009, Wade, 2009). The arguments outlined above are strengthen by Chinas 
recent decision to support the IMF with 40 billion US dollars. But, this is 
conditioned, to do so China demands more influence in the IMF (Hermele 
2009:24ff, The Economist 11.04.2009).  
 
A few commentators also put emphasis on the fact that G20 is such an 
important player in combating the crisis and discussing development policies. 
They argue that this is a shift in global politics from the time when G7 or G8 were 
considered to gather the most influential countries. Thus, they argue that emerging 
  51 
economies has gained institutional influence in an institution which is taking the 
lead in the debate on the financial crisis. This shift in global politics could also be 
said to support the argument outlined above by showing an example of how that it 
is possible for emerging economies to gain more influence in international 
institutions (Hermele, Thirlwell).    
 
 
 
Empirical model outlining increased influence for emerging economies in 
international financial institutions. 
 
 
Emerging economies will create alternative institutions to exist collaterally with 
existing institutions 
As stated above many commentators call for help from China to boost the world 
economy, and view China as the one country that has the material capabilities to 
undertake large measures to save global economy. Wade and Ocampo (2009:34) 
even argue that the crisis has shifted the distribution of power from the west 
towards emerging economies. Furthermore, they argue that it is the first time ever 
when western countries are depending on growth in emerging economies and for 
theses countries to inject liquidity into the economy. They argue that this is a 
power relation were China could exercise power over the US. In the case of the 
IFIs it is possible for China to offer alternative sources of financial support and 
thereby question the neo liberal way of distributing financial support. This is to 
say that the strong material capabilities of primarily China and a dependency of 
China from the west gives China an opportunity to challenge the Washington 
Consensus as a part of the neo liberal agenda. There are already signs that might 
suggest a development in this direction. During 2009 China has issued loans to 
countries like Argentina, Indonesia and Belarus, in total worth 95 billion US 
Institutions 
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possibly implement 
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Material capabilities 
China has strong material 
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crisis other countries have 
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dollars (note that this is more than the support given to the IMF). For theses 
countries the loan could be seen as an alternative to apply for loans from the IMF 
(Griffith-Jones & Ocampo, 2009: 20, Wade 2009,: XXX, Wade & Ocampo, 2009: 
34).  
      
Another commentator, Hermele a Swedish scholar and also a representative for a 
cooperation of Swedish NGOs is pessimistic about reforms within the IFIs. He 
(Hermele 2009) argues that IMF so far only has undertaken marginal changes and 
at the same time the institution has been strengthen by the crisis since more 
money have been channelled though it than before the crisis. This is in accordance 
with our findings from the idea section where G20 states its continued support for 
the IMF and increases its economic support to the institution. A number of 
commentators (see for example Rodrik 01.2009, Wade 2009:12) argue that this 
has strengthened the IMF as the one IFI governing financial policies. Wade 
(2009:12) also argues that the role of the IMF has weakened over the last years, 
but will be re-established due to the important role given to the IMF during the 
current crisis (Rodrik 01.2009, Wade, 2009:12, Griffith-Jones & Ocampo, 2009). 
Thus, it could be argued that the IMF does not have very strong incentives to 
conduct major reforms; they are increasing their budget and abilities to continuing 
to act in the traditional neo liberal way anyway, not far away from the original 
Washington Consensus agenda.  
 
Instead of emerging economies gaining influence in IFIs like the IMF Hermele 
is arguing that alternative institutions like the Chiang Mai-initiative (CMI)3
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 The Chiang Mai-initiative is an association of South-East Asian countries and consists of Brunei, Burma, The 
Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. It was established after the 
Asian crisis to facilitate short term liquidity problems 
 could 
gain influence. China, Japan and South Korea have now agreed to create a fund 
within the CMI to combat the financial crisis and to contribute with funding to 
this worth 120 billion US dollars. Hermele (2009) is arguing that with the 
experience from the Asian crisis the South East Asian countries do not want to be 
dependent on the IMF, therefore they have created this alternative fund. If China 
and other large emerging economies choose to support these kinds of institutions 
and issues alternative loans (as discussed above in the case of Chinese loans to 
Argentina, Belarus and Indonesia), instead of supporting the IMF there is of 
course a risk for the IMF that these institutions grow at the expenses of the IMF. 
Accordingly, Griffith-Jones & Ocampo from the UNDP (2009) are arguing that in 
developing countries there are reserves of about five trillion US dollars. Moreover 
they argue that these could be used for alternative institutions like CMI. Thus, 
there are room for manoeuvre to contribute to alternative institutions and possibly 
by doing so gaining more influence on how loans are being distributed. An 
emerging trend supporting this could be seen. There seems to be a collateral 
development where the IMF get enough support primarily from western countries 
to continue more of less in its traditional neo liberal way and emerging 
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economies, primarily China are channelling its financial support through other 
institutions or bilaterally. Theoretically this would mean that China with its 
material capabilities (together with other countries) is able to create alternative 
institutions and western countries collaterally have the material capabilities to 
state its continued support to the IMF in the debate (i.e. the ideas) and the IFIs are 
able to continue to work according to the Washington Consensus. This is also 
supported by the findings in the collective images in the debate suggesting that the 
G20 still are supporting the IMF and are increasing the economic contribution to 
the institution.   
 
 
 
 
Empirical model outlining emerging economies creating alternative institutions to 
exist collaterally with existing institutions 
 
 
To conclude the discussion whether changes in the IMF really are prevailing 
let us first state that it is still a very open discussion. There are tendencies 
suggesting on the one hand that the material capabilities of, above all China, 
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creates a room for the country to establish alternatives to the IFIs and that the 
western countries are able to sustain the neo liberal institutions collaterally. This 
corresponds to the findings in ideas suggesting that no major changes are 
prevailing in the IFIs. To return to Cox theoretical model this suggests that what 
we are experiencing are rival institutions. On the other hand there are tendencies 
suggesting that China supports existing IFIs if they undertake reforms giving 
more representation to China. This is in accordance with the small changes in 
ideas where reforms of the IFIs are discussed suggesting more representation for 
emerging economies within the institutions. In Cox wordings this would rather 
mean that we will see opposing tendencies within one institution. With this 
background it is impossibly at the moment to say in what direction the IMF is 
changing. In reality, however, the two tendencies are not as extreme as outlined 
above and if one of them is true it does not mean that the other does not have any 
validity. At the moment China is both supporting the IMF and alternative ways of 
financial support. Some changes in the IFIs are being undertaken increasing the 
representation of emerging economies. However, these changes so far have been 
limited and the question is if the IFIs have any incentives to undertake major 
reform when they are getting increased financial support from primarily western 
countries. Thus, it could be argued that what we a experiencing is a mix of the two 
tendencies on how the IMF might be changing.  
 
Another dimension in this discussion is also the question whether China, 
possibly together with a few other emerging economies are capable and willing to 
challenge the neo liberal IFIs for real. Some commentators argue that China is 
probably to preoccupied in increasing domestic growth and has few incentives to 
take the role as an alternative global leader reshaping the governance of 
development polices (Altman 01/02.2009, Wade 2008).   
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6 Conclusion 
When starting to work on this thesis we found it exciting to be able to examine a 
period of time that could possibly bring about big changes, or even trigger a 
paradigm shift in global governance. In our case, in the field of development 
policies, this shed light on the question whether the Washington Consensus and 
the neo liberal agenda had come to an end. However, it did not take too long 
before we understood that this was probably not the case. On the other hand, this 
does not mean that we did not find anything interesting. In this chapter we will 
conclude our main findings. This will be done by outlining a short discussion to 
answer our main research question; To what extent, and how, has the financial 
crisis triggered changes in the one of the main institutions governing development 
policies, the International Monetary Fund (the IMF)? 
 
To scrutinize our sub-research question; To what extent has the financial crisis 
triggered changes in the debate on development policies? we started to map the 
debate on development policies and identified a set of key issues and three core 
actors holding important positions in the debate. Within these frames we started to 
look for changes in the debate. We found out that during the financial crisis the 
position that counter-cyclical policies should be undertaken in times of recession 
gained a little more attention, however the IMF and the G20 did not change their 
position on this regard. Furthermore, more emphasis was put on reforming the 
IFIs. It was argued in the debate that emerging economies should get more 
influence in IFIs. At the same time the IMF strengthen its position as the world 
leading institution for monetary and financial support compared to its relatively 
weak position before the crisis. It was also stated in the idea section in the analysis 
that all the core actors are sharing an intersubjective meaning when taking their 
point in departure within the capitalist system. None of the core actors are 
questioning this.  
 
To scrutinize the other sub-research question; To what extent has the financial 
crisis triggered changes in the global economic architecture? we examined 
statistics from the G20 countries. We found out that the most significant change 
was that China has advanced its material capabilities relatively to other countries. 
 
To scrutinize our last sub-research question; How has the new economic 
architecture and the new ideas arising from the financial crisis possibly changed 
the International Monetary Fund (the IMF)? we used a theoretical model to 
explain institutional changes. The model consists of three components; material 
capabilities, ideas and institutions. When these are interacting changes could 
possibly prevail. Our major findings here were that there are two tendencies 
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towards changes in the IMF. There are tendencies suggesting on the one hand that 
the material capabilities of, above all China, creates a room for the country to 
establish alternatives to the IFIs and that the western countries have the material 
capabilities to sustain the neo liberal institutions collaterally. This corresponds to 
the findings in ideas suggesting that no major changes are prevailing in the IFIs. 
On the other hand there are tendencies suggesting that China supports existing 
IFIs if they undertake reforms giving more representation to China. This 
corresponds to the small changes in collective images where reforms of the IFIs 
are discussed suggesting more representation for emerging economies within the 
institutions. This is to suggest that Chinas increased material capabilities will 
eventually give them more influence in existing IFIs. With this background it is 
impossible at the moment to say in what direction the IMF will develop. In reality, 
however, the two tendencies are not as extreme as outlined above and if one of 
them is true it does not mean that the other does not have any validity. At the 
moment China is both supporting the IMF and alternative ways of financial 
support. Some changes in the IFIs are being undertaken increasing the 
representation of emerging economies. However, these changes so far have been 
limited and the question is if the IFIs have any incentives to undertake major 
reforms when they are getting increased financial support from primarily western 
countries. Thus, it could be argued that what we are experiencing is a mix of the 
two tendencies on how the IMF is changing.  
 
To end where we started this is also to say that we will probably not 
experience a paradigm shift in term of declaring the neo liberal agenda and the 
Washington Consensus dead. It was also stated in the thesis that none of the core 
actors in the debate on development policies are questioning the capitalist system 
as the point of departure for future development policies. However, it was stated 
that the IMF could be changing due to two tendencies. No matter which one of the 
two tendencies that will provide the best explanation to the development of the 
IMF, the emerging economies and in particular China will gain more influence in 
this process. 
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7 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter we will reflect on some of the theoretical and methodological 
choices made in the thesis. Alternative choices are presented and discussed 
compared to our choices. We will focus the discussion on the choice of theoretical 
model for institutional change and the choices of core actors in the debate on 
development policies. Finally we will reflect on choosing the IMF as our main 
research object. 
 
 
Choice of theoretical model for institutional change 
 
An important factor for how the thesis is structured and how the empirical 
material is understood and analysed is the choice of theoretical model to explain 
institutional change. To reflect on our choice we will discuss other possible 
theories that we could have used. When doing so we will discuss whether 
choosing another theoretical model would have given us a different understanding 
of the empirical material. The theoretical models examined below are from an 
article reviewing different theories on institutional change. The article scrutinizes 
different theories on institutional change by discussing their suggestions on the 
causes of institutional change, the process and outcome of institutional change. 
We will use this structure when discussing other theoretical models in relation to 
the one we choose to use.   
 
In “our” theoretical model it is suggested that institutional change is triggered 
by changes in material capabilities and ideas. These components are then 
interacting within the institution for changes to prevail. Similar to the material 
capabilities in “our” theoretical model it is suggested by other scholars that 
knowledge, resource ownership, income distribution and technological changes 
could be exogenous triggers to cause institutional change (Ostrom, Grief & Laitin 
in Kingston & Caballero, 2006: 5ff, 19). As mentioned in the theory chapter in the 
thesis a contribution from the social constructivist perspective suggests that 
institutions will develop when ideas governing them are changing (Blyth 2001). 
This perspective on the other hand is similar to the ideas in “our” theoretical 
model. 
 
In “our” theoretical model the process of institutional change is described as 
how the interaction between the components develops. It is stated that it is to be 
determined by every specific case how the exogenous components material 
capabilities and ideas are interacting within the institution to achieve change. The 
theoretical models outlined in the article are rather focusing on the internal 
process for changes to arise. Most of them are emphasising that a bargaining 
  58 
process between the actors are determining how the process develops as well as 
the features of the outcome.  
 
One scholar (Knight in Kingston & Caballero, 2006:4-5) suggests that 
inequalities in bargaining power might affect the features of the institution and 
that differences in wealth could be one example of unequal bargaining power. 
Another scholar (Libecap in Kingston & Caballero 2006:5-6) suggests that often 
different actors create a group to preserve status quo within the institution. Thus, 
the origin of the institution will determine how it develops. As a result, inefficient 
institutions may persist and will be unlikely to change.  
 
Yet another scholar (North in Kingston & Caballero, 2006:11-12) argues that 
a dominant player might govern the institution to maximise its own outcome. The 
institution develops from the deliberative process between the involved actors. 
Ostrom (Ostrom in Kingston & Caballero, 2006:7ff) agrees that institutions 
changes by the deliberative process between the involved actors, but they might 
be inefficient for another reason than the one mentioned above. The actors within 
the institutions might believe that the outcome will be beneficial, but when 
implemented it is not. Thus, inefficiency could also be caused by “bad” decisions. 
 
Another suggestion for how an institution might develop is from a game 
theory approach suggesting that the actors in the institution are acting rational 
based on expectations of how other actors might act. When the expectations 
change the actions taken by the actor’s changes and thereby the institution 
changes (Calvert in Kingston & Caballero, 2006:13).  
 
When comparing our theoretical model to the ones presented above there 
seems to be a number of similar theoretical models taking into account either 
something similar to the material capabilities or the ideas in our model. Based on 
this our model has an advantage in taking into account both of these components 
for causing changes in institutions.  
 
When considering the process and outcome of institutional change the 
differences between the models presented above and our model are bigger. The 
other models have in common that they are all focusing on internal processes 
within the institution to achieve change, for example the deliberative or 
bargaining process between the actors in the institution. In our model the focus is 
rather on the overall debate within the field in which the institution is working and 
on other exogenous factors. It would have been interesting to use one of the other 
models to scrutinize internal processes within the IMF. However, a very limited 
access to the material needed (such as access to IMF-meeting or possibilities to 
interview negotiators within the IMF) to conduct such a study would make it 
impossible.    
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Choice of core actors in the debate on development policies and the IMF as our 
research object  
 
When choosing the core actors to scrutinize changes in the debate on development 
policies, we found it interesting and challenging to find out who our core actors 
would be, who would for instance, give the broadest possible picture of the 
debate.  
 
We discussed choosing more than one body from the United Nations (UN), for 
example UNDP and UNCTAD considered. However, our final decision was to 
focus on the Commission on financial reforms as one of the core actors. This 
decision was based on the fact that it the one UN-body specialising on the 
financial crisis. Furthermore, it gives an alternative view to the debate on 
development policies compared to the other two chosen core actors.  
 
The G20 was chosen since it consists of the economically strongest countries 
of the world. In this sense the G7 (or G8) could have been chosen. However, we 
choose the G20 since it is engaging more in the debate on development policies 
and are also given more space in the debate than the G7.  
 
Finally we chose the IMF to be a core actor in the debate on development 
policies, but first and foremost to be our research object when scrutinizing 
institutional change. Since we wanted to examine the governance of development 
policies an institution within the Washington Consensus was an obvious choice 
(since the Washington Consensus has been the dominant ideology within 
development policies the last two decades). We could have chosen the World 
Bank instead of the IMF, however since the fact that the IMF has been given more 
focus in the debate on development policies after the outbreak of the financial 
crisis determined our decision. This being said, it would have been interesting to 
see whether the World Bank is experiencing the same changes (or lack of 
changes) as the IMF.    
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9 Attachments 
17 G20 nations - Development of GDP, annual percent change 2006 -– 2009 
 
Country Subject Descriptor Units Scale 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Estimates Start 
After 
Australia 
Gross domestic product, 
constant prices Annual percent change 2.839 4.021 2.061 -1.449 2008 
Brazil 
Gross domestic product, 
constant prices Annual percent change 3.969 5.670 5.076 -1.301 2008 
Canada 
Gross domestic product, 
constant prices Annual percent change 3.110 2.713 0.457 -2.540 2008 
China 
Gross domestic product, 
constant prices Annual percent change 11.606 13.012 9.047 6.520 2008 
France 
Gross domestic product, 
constant prices Annual percent change 2.362 2.105 0.716 -2.952 2008 
Germany 
Gross domestic product, 
constant prices Annual percent change 2.979 2.511 1.290 -5.614 2008 
India 
Gross domestic product, 
constant prices Annual percent change 9.817 9.295 7.288 4.523 2008 
Indonesia 
Gross domestic product, 
constant prices Annual percent change 5.501 6.278 6.062 2.495 2008 
Italy 
Gross domestic product, 
constant prices Annual percent change 2.036 1.564 -1.040 -4.450 2008 
Japan 
Gross domestic product, 
constant prices Annual percent change 2.039 2.392 -0.641 -6.197 2008 
Korea 
Gross domestic product, 
constant prices Annual percent change 5.179 5.106 2.224 -4.015 2008 
Mexico 
Gross domestic product, 
constant prices Annual percent change 5.127 3.330 1.348 -3.671 2007 
Russia 
Gross domestic product, 
constant prices Annual percent change 7.700 8.100 5.600 -5.977 2008 
South Africa 
Gross domestic product, 
constant prices Annual percent change 5.321 5.098 3.062 -0.318 2008 
Turkey 
Gross domestic product, 
constant prices Annual percent change 6.893 4.669 1.060 -5.100 2008 
United Kingdom 
Gross domestic product, 
constant prices Annual percent change 2.838 3.022 0.707 -4.086 2008 
United States 
Gross domestic product, 
constant prices Annual percent change 2.779 2.028 1.111 -2.751 2008 
         
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009      
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17 G20 nations - Development of balance of payments in billions of US dollars 2006 – 2009 
 
Country Subject Descriptor Units Scale 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Estimates 
Start 
After 
Australia 
Current account 
balance U.S. dollars Billions -40.384 -57.129 -42.833 -43.927 2008  
Brazil 
Current account 
balance U.S. dollars Billions 13.643 1.551 -28.300 -23.109 2008  
Canada 
Current account 
balance U.S. dollars Billions 17.838 12.726 9.652 -10.901 2008  
China 
Current account 
balance U.S. dollars Billions 253.268 371.833 440.011 496.569 2008  
France 
Current account 
balance U.S. dollars Billions -12.835 -26.915 -45.327 -8.891 2008  
Germany 
Current account 
balance U.S. dollars Billions 178.837 250.263 235.257 71.667 2008  
India 
Current account 
balance U.S. dollars Billions -9.299 -11.285 -33.330 -29.125 2008  
Indonesia 
Current account 
balance U.S. dollars Billions 10.859 10.494 0.521 -1.886 2007  
Italy 
Current account 
balance U.S. dollars Billions -48.350 -51.208 -73.200 -60.196 2008  
Japan 
Current account 
balance U.S. dollars Billions 170.437 210.967 157.079 76.363 2008  
Korea 
Current account 
balance U.S. dollars Billions 5.385 5.876 -6.406 20.754 2008  
Mexico 
Current account 
balance U.S. dollars Billions -4.375 -8.171 -15.527 -20.840 2007  
Russia 
Current account 
balance U.S. dollars Billions 94.340 76.241 102.331 5.988 2008  
South Africa 
Current account 
balance U.S. dollars Billions -16.284 -20.707 -20.530 -14.062 2008  
Turkey 
Current account 
balance U.S. dollars Billions -31.893 -37.684 -41.416 -6.646 2008  
United 
Kingdom 
Current account 
balance U.S. dollars Billions -82.975 -80.722 -45.392 -40.730 2008  
United States 
Current account 
balance U.S. dollars Billions 
-
788.115 
-
731.214 
-
673.266 
-
393.250 2008  
          
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 
2009       
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17 G20 nations – Monthly net trade in goods s.a., in billions of US dollars 
 
Data extracted on 12 May 2009 12:31 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat 
Subject Net trade in goods (value) s.a., in billions of US dollars
 
Time Oct-2006 
Nov-
2006 
Dec-
2006 
Jan-
2007 
Feb-
2007 
Mar-
2007 
Apr-
2007 
May-
2007 
Jun-
2007 
Jul-
2007 
Aug-
2007 
Sep-
2007 
Oct-
2007 
Nov-
2007 
Dec-
2007 
Jan-
2008 
Feb-
2008 
Mar-
2008 
Apr-
2008 
May-
2008 
Jun-
2008 
Jul-
2008 
Aug-
2008 
Sep-
2008 
Oct-
2008 
Nov-
2008 
Dec-
2008 
Jan-
2009 
Feb-
2009 
Mar-
2009 
Frequency 
Monthly 
                              
Country                                
Australia  -0.86 -0.56 -1.24 -0.70 -0.54 -1.13 -1.14 -0.97 -1.44 -0.64 -1.56 -1.88 -2.49 -1.80 -1.44 -2.45 -2.94 -1.54 -0.66 -1.02 -0.64 -0.85 0.83 1.18 1.95 0.76 0.10 0.64 1.05 2.17 
Canada  2.58 3.36 3.77 4.29 3.16 3.62 4.24 4.68 4.41 2.31 3.23 1.44 3.19 3.55 2.22 3.56 5.47 4.24 6.98 4.59 4.30 6.02 4.55 4.08 3.05 1.24 1.14 -1.14 0.28 .. 
France  -3.86 -3.60 -4.59 -4.01 -5.64 -3.29 -5.32 -4.56 -4.92 -6.64 -4.74 -6.21 -6.48 -7.73 -7.30 -7.20 -5.88 -8.05 -8.95 -8.47 -9.64 -9.93 -9.44 -8.91 -9.47 -9.81 -6.24 -5.58 -5.86 .. 
Germany   20.51 18.78 19.94 21.28 20.11 22.15 19.72 23.05 20.39 23.96 20.89 25.66 23.48 25.52 23.89 23.82 23.47 25.16 27.28 24.18 26.43 21.13 22.59 20.62 19.99 15.81 16.46 7.78 8.19 .. 
Italy  -2.58 -1.13 -1.09 -1.63 -1.75 -0.64 -1.39 -1.17 0.42 -1.27 -1.10 -0.64 -0.87 -0.59 -2.47 -1.29 -0.03 -2.46 -1.81 -1.84 -2.11 -1.54 -3.04 -1.13 -0.92 -1.37 -0.51 -2.46 -0.29 .. 
Japan  5.85 7.70 6.29 8.37 5.01 8.85 9.51 5.87 7.35 7.33 9.58 8.82 9.00 7.62 5.69 8.71 6.09 6.70 5.97 4.64 0.79 0.52 -2.51 -0.37 -2.57 -3.51 -1.89 -4.61 -0.77 -0.99 
Korea  1.32 2.59 1.18 2.29 2.13 2.18 -0.44 0.77 2.55 2.45 2.31 1.04 0.56 0.33 -1.05 -2.18 -0.35 -1.24 0.50 0.24 -3.43 0.53 -3.91 -2.50 -0.86 -2.28 1.72 -2.18 4.21 4.83 
Mexico  -0.85 -0.55 -0.80 -1.28 -1.00 -1.18 -1.49 -1.15 -1.46 -0.98 -0.66 -0.26 -0.71 0.58 -0.21 -1.05 -1.89 -0.81 -1.23 -0.46 -0.92 -1.08 -2.08 -2.01 -1.98 -2.20 -1.66 -1.10 -1.11 -1.06 
Turkey  -4.95 -4.61 -4.11 -4.51 -4.80 -4.70 -4.69 -5.13 -4.76 -5.55 -4.86 -5.84 -6.58 -5.87 -5.96 -6.21 -6.31 -5.88 -6.53 -6.01 -6.99 -6.94 -6.89 -5.51 -5.39 -3.12 -3.50 -1.14 -0.89 -2.77 
United 
Kingdom  
-
11.47 
-
12.67 
-
13.45 
-
13.28 
-
14.26 
-
15.47 
-
13.44 
-
14.63 
-
14.74 
-
16.07 
-
15.57 
-
17.10 
-
16.18 
-
16.73 
-
15.62 
-
15.85 
-
15.66 
-
15.55 
-
15.26 
-
15.64 
-
16.56 
-
16.00 
-
14.56 
-
13.48 
-
12.40 
-
11.92 
-
10.33 
-
11.70 
-
10.26 .. 
United 
States  
-
65.62 
-
64.98 
-
68.76 
-
66.21 
-
66.44 
-
70.71 
-
68.75 
-
68.47 
-
68.66 
-
67.79 
-
66.67 
-
66.74 
-
67.71 
-
71.70 
-
69.51 
-
70.66 
-
73.00 
-
68.92 
-
73.47 
-
72.63 
-
71.78 
-
74.63 
-
71.57 
-
70.05 
-
69.56 
-
53.29 
-
51.26 
-
46.93 
-
36.86 .. 
Brazil  3.80 3.94 4.40 3.83 4.06 3.56 4.39 3.81 3.09 2.84 2.92 2.94 3.29 2.77 2.65 2.63 1.72 1.25 1.97 3.49 1.76 3.02 1.30 2.32 1.32 2.14 1.53 0.31 2.77 2.40 
China  18.09 17.80 18.31 19.18 36.41 10.57 20.09 21.36 26.52 22.99 21.87 23.67 20.84 20.28 19.93 21.39 17.65 19.31 20.59 19.41 17.94 22.95 26.67 28.50 25.62 36.57 35.69 42.04 11.55 
22.5
6 
India  -6.69 -4.70 -4.95 -2.96 -5.84 -5.50 -6.24 -5.55 -7.98 -5.92 -6.46 -4.21 -6.01 -7.07 -6.85 -7.61 -7.39 -8.02 -7.90 -9.71 -9.11 
-
11.12 
-
13.28 
-
12.38 -8.42 -9.99 -7.12 -6.50 .. .. 
Indonesia  3.44 3.50 4.03 3.15 3.81 3.61 3.61 3.37 3.45 3.53 3.10 2.69 3.22 2.60 3.23 2.13 1.06 1.32 0.13 1.36 0.37 0.39 1.04 1.05 -0.43 0.81 0.26 0.82 1.24 1.76 
Russian 
Federation  8.30 10.28 11.85 7.96 9.84 9.74 9.91 10.06 9.69 10.08 10.03 11.63 12.18 14.43 16.08 16.52 14.69 17.17 14.79 16.41 18.18 18.14 19.79 16.21 11.19 11.46 5.96 6.13 5.31 .. 
South 
Africa  -0.87 -1.37 -1.20 -1.08 -0.66 -0.83 -0.63 -0.47 -1.15 -1.08 -1.01 -0.63 -1.08 -0.06 -1.56 -0.60 -1.11 -1.08 -1.01 -0.61 -0.51 -1.08         
 
 
 
 
 
